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Among the questions that vex the federalism literature are why states check the federal 
government and whether Americans identify with the states as well as the nation.  This 
Article argues that partisanship supplies the core of an answer to both questions.  
Competition between today’s ideologically coherent, polarized parties leads state actors 
to make demands for autonomy, to enact laws rejected by the federal government, and to 
fight federal programs from within.  States thus check the federal government by 
channeling partisan conflict through federalism’s institutional framework.  Partisanship 
also recasts the longstanding debate about whether Americans identify with the states.  
Democratic and Republican, not state and national, are today’s political identities, but 
the state and federal governments are sites of partisan affiliation.  As these governments 
advance distinct partisan positions, individuals identify with them in shifting, variable 
ways; Americans are particularly likely to identify with states when they are controlled 
by the party out of power in Washington. 
States also serve as laboratories of national partisan politics by facilitating competition 
within each political party.  In so doing, they participate in national political contests 
without forfeiting the particularity and pluralism we associate with the local.  By 
instantiating different partisan positions, moreover, states generate a federalist variant of 
surrogate representation: individuals across the country may affiliate with states they do 
not inhabit based on their partisan commitments.  Attending to the intersection of 
partisanship and federalism has implications for a number of doctrinal controversies, 
such as campaign finance across state lines and access to state public records.  The 
analysis here suggests that porous state borders may enhance states’ ability to challenge 
the federal government and to serve as sites of political identification. 
INTRODUCTION 
e cannot fully understand our federal system today without  
taking account of partisan competition.  Consider a few recent 
snapshots: 
In the spring of 2010, Republican officials in twenty-seven states 
filed lawsuits arguing that the Patient Protection and Affordable Care 
Act unconstitutionally intruded on state sovereignty.  The Act was the 
signature achievement of a Democratic President and Congress; not a 
single Republican member of Congress voted for the law.  And no 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
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Democratic state officials joined the federalism challenge.  Instead, 
they defended the Act as a valid exercise of national authority.1 
Several years earlier, Democratic officials in eight states passed 
laws to encourage and fund embryonic stem cell research in response 
to a Republican President’s executive directive prohibiting the use of 
federal funds for such research.  When a Democratic President as-
sumed office, he brought federal policy in line with these state laws.2 
Throughout 2011 and 2012, the Wisconsin gubernatorial recall elec-
tion attracted financial contributions from across the country.  Indi-
viduals nationwide saw the race as a contest between a burgeoning 
Republican “right to work” movement and a labor-friendly Democratic 
agenda.  Both the incumbent Republican Governor and his Democrat-
ic challenger received contributions from all fifty states, with out-of-
state contributions rivaling in-state contributions.3 
In each episode, states functioned as important sites of partisan 
conflict, and partisanship, in turn, shaped state governance.  Republi-
can state officials challenged decisions by Democratic federal officials.  
Democratic state officials challenged decisions by Republican federal 
officials.  And individuals from Alaska to Florida, Maine to Hawaii, 
saw the states as fora for national partisan fights. 
Without an appreciation of partisanship’s influence, dynamics con-
sidered fundamental to our federal system are obscure.  Take, for ex-
ample, the widely assumed role of states in checking the federal  
government.  There is nothing essential about the nature of state gov-
ernments that leads them to oppose their national counterpart, and 
courts and commentators are more likely to tout state contestation 
than to explain why it occurs.4  Yet we do see substantial opposition.  
States argue that the federal government is exceeding its proper 
bounds and infringing state autonomy.  They pass laws to prod the 
federal government into action or to resist its policy choices.  And they 
push back against federal directives in carrying out federal programs.  
In recent years, states have challenged federal law regulating marriage 
as an intrusion on state sovereignty, adopted their own versions of 
failed federal legislation regarding greenhouse gas emissions and the 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 1 See infra notes 73–79 and accompanying text. 
 2 See infra notes 98–107 and accompanying text. 
 3 See infra note 258 and accompanying text. 
 4 See Heather K. Gerken, The Supreme Court, 2009 Term — Foreword: Federalism All the 
Way Down, 124 HARV. L. REV. 4, 48 (2010) (“For most theories of federalism to have any bite, 
different majorities must control at the state and national level.  But surprisingly little is written 
about the precise source of variation.” (footnote omitted)); Daryl J. Levinson, Empire-Building 
Government in Constitutional Law, 118 HARV. L. REV. 915, 944 (2005) (arguing that courts and 
many commentators wrongly “personify[] the state and federal governments as self-interested  
political actors with empire-building ambitions, pitted against each other in a competition for 
power”).  
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funding of Planned Parenthood, administered federal immigration law 
in a decidedly uncooperative manner, and more. 
A key, yet largely neglected, reason for these state challenges is  
partisanship.  Put in only slightly caricatured terms, Republican-led 
states challenge the federal government when it is controlled by Dem-
ocrats, while Democratic-led states challenge the federal government 
when it is controlled by Republicans.  States oppose federal policy be-
cause they are governed by individuals who affiliate with a different 
political party than do those in charge at the national level, not be-
cause they are states as such.  And the fact that there are fifty states 
and many actors composing the federal and state governments is criti-
cal.  Because it is party politics that draws the battle lines, some state 
and federal actors line up on the side of the federal government, while 
other state and federal actors line up on the side of the states.  Federal-
ism provides the institutional terrain for disputes that are substantive 
in nature. 
Partisanship also sheds new light on an old debate in the federalism 
literature: whether Americans have state as well as national political 
identities.  Scholars have long argued about whether the states have 
unique cultures that command citizen loyalty,5 but identification with 
states may be more contingent than this debate suggests.  As recent 
work in political theory and psychology has shown, partisanship is an 
important aspect of personal identity and source of community.6  
Democratic and Republican, not state and national, are today’s politi-
cal identities.  But the state and federal governments are important 
sites of partisan affiliation.  As these governments advance competing 
partisan positions, individuals identify with them in shifting, variable 
ways.  Americans are especially likely to feel loyal to the states when 
they are controlled by the party out of power in Washington, as some 
number of them always will be. 
Partisan federalism, as this Article defines it, involves political ac-
tors’ use of state and federal governments in ways that articulate, 
stage, and amplify competition between the political parties, and the 
affective individual processes of state and national identification that 
accompany this dynamic.  Attending to partisanship reveals that our 
contemporary federal system generates a check on the federal govern-
ment and fosters divided citizen loyalties, as courts and scholars fre-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 5 Compare, e.g., DANIEL J. ELAZAR, AMERICAN FEDERALISM 150–73 (3d ed. 1984) (argu-
ing they do), with, e.g., MALCOLM M. FEELEY & EDWARD RUBIN, FEDERALISM 118–20 (2008) 
(insisting they do not). 
 6 See, e.g., DONALD GREEN ET AL., PARTISAN HEARTS AND MINDS (2002); NANCY L. 
ROSENBLUM, ON THE SIDE OF THE ANGELS (2008). 
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quently assume.  But it does so for an unexplored reason — because it 
provides durable and robust scaffolding for partisan conflict.7 
Part I examines how party politics drives states to contest federal 
government action.  Existing scholarship describes how the parties 
breed cooperation among state and national politicians,8 but the rise of 
ideologically coherent, polarized parties means that partisanship mat-
ters more for the competition it generates than for the cooperation it 
inspires.  States make demands for autonomy, they enact shadow poli-
cies rejected by the federal government, they fight federal programs 
from within — and they do all of this because of partisan commit-
ments.  They thus check the federal government by channeling parti-
san conflict through federalism’s institutional framework. 
Turning from politicians to their constituents, Part II argues that 
partisanship provides an ingredient many scholars find missing in con-
temporary American federalism: a reason for individuals to identify 
with and feel loyal to states rather than the nation alone.  People may 
identify with the states not because they represent something essential-
ly different from the nation, but rather because they represent compet-
ing Democratic and Republican visions of the national will.  Focusing 
on partisanship suggests that state-based identification may be fluid 
and partial — and, perhaps paradoxically, a means of expressing na-
tional identity — but nonetheless an important buttress of American 
federalism. 
Part III considers the horizontal dimensions of partisan federal con-
testation and identification.  Our political parties are themselves feder-
ated entities, and states flesh out both interpartisan and intrapartisan 
competition in diverse ways.  In so doing, they serve as “laboratories” 
of national partisan politics; they participate in national political con-
tests without forfeiting the particularity and pluralism we associate 
with the local.  By advancing different partisan positions, moreover, 
the states become distinct from the federal government and from each 
other in ways likely to resonate with individuals throughout the na-
tion.  Insofar as state identification is driven by partisanship, individu-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 7 This Article argues that partisanship is critical to understanding contemporary American 
federalism, but to be clear, the claim is not that partisanship is the only basis for state action, state 
identity, or the like.  No single claim about federalism can have such all-embracing descriptive 
power.  Moreover, although the Article is principally descriptive, it offers a sympathetic rendering 
of partisan federalism.  One could, however, accept this descriptive account and conclude that 
partisan federalism is a pernicious phenomenon.  Consideration of the many tradeoffs that inform 
a complete normative assessment must await future work. 
 8 See, e.g., MORTON GRODZINS, THE AMERICAN SYSTEM (Daniel J. Elazar ed., Transac-
tion Books 1984) (1966); WILLIAM H. RIKER, FEDERALISM (1964); Larry D. Kramer, Putting 
the Politics Back into the Political Safeguards of Federalism, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 215 (2000). 
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als may therefore affiliate with states they do not inhabit, realizing a 
federalist form of surrogate representation.9 
Part IV takes up a few doctrinal questions prompted by the notion 
of cross-state affiliation.  While courts have largely held, on First 
Amendment grounds, that states may not bar nonresidents from mak-
ing campaign contributions and expenditures in connection with state 
elections, the legitimacy of the practice is a federalism question as well.  
Perhaps counterintuitively, this Part suggests that porous state borders 
may facilitate states’ ability to serve as counterweights to the federal 
government and as sites of political identification.  As it rationalizes 
aspects of campaign finance jurisprudence, however, this understand-
ing calls into question the Supreme Court’s recent decision upholding 
state limits on nonresident access to public records.10 
The framework of partisan federalism highlights the mutual en-
tailment of nationalism and federalism in the early twenty-first centu-
ry.  States participate in controversies that are national in scope and do 
so on behalf of the nation’s people at large.  Yet they are not simply 
agents of the federal government or administrative units of a homoge-
nous polity.  As states advance national partisan positions different 
from those advanced by the federal government and one another, they 
challenge and disrupt national policy and give rise to meaningful polit-
ical identification.  A focus on partisan federalism underscores the cen-
trality of states to our political order even as it destabilizes conceptions 
of states as self-contained communities. 
I.  STATES AS SITES OF PARTISAN OPPOSITION 
Courts and scholars frequently celebrate state-federal contestation, 
but they rarely focus on why it occurs.  Party politics offers a powerful 
explanation.  States controlled by one party challenge the federal  
government when it is controlled by the other party.11  They argue 
that it is exceeding its authority and trampling on state prerogatives.  
They enact their own legislation to dissent from federal policy and 
chart a different course.  And they administer federal laws in ways not 
intended or welcomed by the federal administration.  While all of these 
actions depend on federalism’s structure, they are motivated by parti-
san conflict. 
Today’s partisan federalism reflects the convergence of two trends.  
First, our two major political parties, which compete at both the state 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 9 See Jane Mansbridge, Rethinking Representation, 97 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 515, 522 (2003) 
(defining a surrogate representative as one “with whom one has no electoral relationship — that 
is, a representative in another district”). 
 10 McBurney v. Young, 133 S. Ct. 1709 (2013). 
 11 On some complications related to the notion of party control, see infra pp. 1096–97. 
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and national levels, have grown ideologically cohesive and polarized.  
Second, the states and the federal government increasingly regulate in 
overlapping areas rather than separate spheres.  Independently, each of 
these developments has been much discussed;12 their interaction is 
what I consider here.  Section I.A critiques how leading federalism 
scholarship conceptualizes political parties and state-federal competi-
tion.  Section I.B illustrates how states serve as critical fora for parti-
san conflict insofar as they occupy the same regulatory terrain as the 
federal government while being governed by representatives of polar-
ized political parties. 
A.  Parties as a Safeguard of Federalism 
To understand what partisan federalism is, we first have to see 
what it is not.  Partisan federalism represents a departure from both 
the federalism literature’s description of American political parties and 
its depiction of state challenges to the federal government.  The lead-
ing account of the relationship between federalism and partisan poli-
tics casts the parties as noncentralized and nonprogrammatic, and it 
suggests that partisanship is a basis for state-federal cooperation, not 
competition.  Meanwhile, distinct strands of federalism doctrine and 
scholarship understand state opposition to the federal government to 
be a core value of federalism, but they tend not to question why it oc-
curs.  Today’s ideologically cohesive, polarized parties help to explain 
state challenges to the federal government while also expanding our 
conception of state opposition.  Partisan federalism’s challenges follow 
from state-federal overlap and integration, and they involve state and 
federal actors alike turning to state governments to articulate and 
stage partisan competition. 
1.  Parties. — If you asked informed Americans what features are 
most notable about today’s two-party system, you would likely be told 
that the parties are ideologically cohesive and polarized.  Yet legal 
scholarship’s leading account assimilating federalism and party poli-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 12 On today’s cohesive, polarized parties, see, for example, ALAN I. ABRAMOWITZ, THE 
DISAPPEARING CENTER (2010); JOHN H. ALDRICH, WHY PARTIES? A SECOND LOOK 163–
323 (2011); Geoffrey C. Layman et al., Party Polarization in American Politics: Characteristics, 
Causes, and Consequences, 9 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 83 (2006); and Richard H. Pildes, Why the 
Center Does Not Hold: The Causes of Hyperpolarized Democracy in America, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 
273 (2011).  On the rise of overlapping spheres of state and federal authority, see, for example, 
ELAZAR, supra note 5; GRODZINS, supra note 8; ERIN RYAN, FEDERALISM AND THE TUG OF 
WAR WITHIN (2011); ROBERT A. SCHAPIRO, POLYPHONIC FEDERALISM (2009); and Roderick 
M. Hills, Jr., Against Preemption: How Federalism Can Improve the National Legislative Process, 
82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (2007). 
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tics, Larry Kramer’s revitalization of process federalism, describes the 
parties in almost opposite terms.13 
Instead of focusing on the composition of the federal government,14 
Kramer locates his political safeguards in unplanned structures that 
link the fortunes of state and federal officials, especially the political 
parties.  Drawing on the work of political scientists including Morton 
Grodzins and William Riker, who emphasized the decentralized and 
nonideological character of American parties,15 Kramer casts the 
weakness of the parties as key to his account in two respects.  First, he 
maintains, the parties are not programmatic.  Their primary purpose is 
to get candidates elected, not to advance an agenda.  As a result, party 
platforms are not taken seriously, parties switch ideological positions 
with ease, and there is substantial intraparty disagreement on funda-
mental issues.16  Second, according to Kramer, American parties are 
noncentralized — they are “confederations of national, state, and local 
cadres whose most conspicuous features are flabby organization and 
slack discipline.”17  Ultimately, for Kramer, parties’ nonprogrammatic 
and noncentralized nature yields a political climate in which federal 
officials depend on their state copartisans to get, and stay, elected, and 
this dependency leads federal lawmakers to respect state autonomy.18 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 13 See Kramer, supra note 8; Larry Kramer, Understanding Federalism, 47 VAND. L. REV. 
1485 (1994). 
 14 See Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in the 
Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543 (1954); see also 
JESSE H. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS (1980).  
 15 See GRODZINS, supra note 8, at 254 (“[T]he parties are responsible for both the existence 
and form of the considerable measure of decentralization that exists in the United States.”); 
RIKER, supra note 8, at 91–96 (describing decentralization as the key feature of American politi-
cal parties). 
 16 Kramer, supra note 13, at 1524–26.  
 17 Kramer, supra note 8, at 279. 
 18 E.g., id. at 282.  As others have noted, there is a missing link in Kramer’s account: even if 
one accepts his premise that federal lawmakers will defer to state politicians’ interests, it is not 
clear why these interests will include respect for the autonomy of state government.  See, e.g.,  
Steven G. Calabresi, “A Government of Limited and Enumerated Powers”: In Defense of United 
States v. Lopez, 94 MICH. L. REV. 752, 798 (1995).  Daryl Levinson has suggested that this cri-
tique is misplaced because Kramer is “agnostic about the interests of state officials,” believing that 
federalism is successful as long as “state representatives can force the national government to take 
account of the interests of their constituents, whatever those interests might be.”  Levinson, supra 
note 4, at 940 n.89.  While Levinson’s argument is in keeping with Kramer’s general sensitivity to 
the contingency of state-federal relations, see, e.g., Kramer, supra note 8, at 292–93, it does not 
capture Kramer’s argument about political parties.  Indeed, Kramer takes Herbert Wechsler to 
task for the very move Levinson attributes to Kramer — focusing on state interests rather than 
institutions.  After insisting that Wechsler has wrongly conflated state-based interests and the 
governance prerogatives of state institutions, Kramer continues: “So far as I am aware, no one 
defends federalism on the ground that it makes national representatives sensitive to private inter-
ests organized along state or local lines.  Rather, federalism is meant to preserve the regulatory 
authority of state and local institutions to legislate policy choices.”  Id. at 222; see also Kramer, 
supra note 13, at 1523 (arguing that parties “protect[] state institutions by inducing federal law-
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While there is much to be said for Kramer’s account, his character-
ization of the parties as noncentralized ideological hodgepodges misses 
key features of our contemporary parties that have become only more 
pronounced since he wrote.  Some scholars who quarrel with Kramer’s 
view argue that the parties are highly centralized, with national elites 
driving presidential nominations, fundraising, and the formulation of 
party agendas at both the national and state levels.19  But characteriz-
ing the parties as centralized entities still seems to miss the mark.  To-
day’s parties are best understood as networks of individuals and or-
ganizations, including elected representatives and party officials, but 
also allied interest groups, issue activists, political action committees 
(PACs) and Super PACs, candidates’ personal campaign organizations, 
political consultants, and the like.20  While national party committees 
may be more powerful than their state counterparts, this does not 
mean the parties are fully centralized.  To the contrary, there is a 
strong argument that the parties have become more decentralized over 
time, just not along a federalism axis.  Private individuals and organi-
zations have replaced state and local governments as loci of party in-
fluence.21  In a recent publication defending its role, for instance, the 
Republican National Committee barely attempts to conceal anxiety 
about its control over the “multitude of . . . third-party groups that we 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
makers to take account of (at least some) desires of state officials” (emphases added)).  Kramer’s 
revision of process federalism assumes state politicians will defend state government autonomy 
but does not explain why this would be so.  For a safeguards account that defines federalism in 
terms of interests rather than institutions, see Franita Tolson, Benign Partisanship, 88 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 395 (2012); and Franita Tolson, Partisan Gerrymandering as a Safeguard of Feder-
alism, 2010 UTAH L. REV. 859. 
 19 See, e.g., Paul Frymer & Albert Yoon, Political Parties, Representation, and Federal Safe-
guards, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 977, 980 (2002) (“Today, national party leaders bear far less of a rela-
tionship to local or state party organizations, and instead shape the nomination process and raise 
the money to mount national campaigns that are in many ways divorced from local concerns and 
political pressures.”); see also, e.g., ALDRICH, supra note 12, at 269–74 (describing nationalization 
of both parties and arguing that flow is “top down,” id. at 273 (internal quotation marks omitted)); 
Thomas M. Holbrook & Raymond J. La Raja, Parties and Elections, in POLITICS IN THE 
AMERICAN STATES 63, 78–80, 98 (Virginia Gray et al. eds., 10th ed. 2013) (“State parties have 
also come into the orbit of the national party organizations, which, through massive transfers of 
funds plus supplies of personnel and expertise, now use the state parties to implement national 
campaign strategies.”  Id. at 98.).  Kramer himself appreciated that state parties had lost strength 
as elections became more candidate centered and national committees began to assume greater 
control over party operations.  See Kramer, supra note 13, at 1527–28, 1536–38. 
 20 See, e.g., DAVID KAROL, PARTY POSITION CHANGE IN AMERICAN POLITICS (2009) 
(advancing a model of political parties as coalitions of groups); SETH E. MASKET, NO MIDDLE 
GROUND (2009) (examining the role of “informal party organizations” in controlling contempo-
rary political parties); Kathleen Bawn et al., A Theory of Political Parties: Groups, Policy De-
mands and Nominations in American Politics, 10 PERSP. ON POL. 571 (2012) (proposing a theory 
of political parties in which interest groups and activists are the key actors).  
 21 See generally MASKET, supra note 20 (arguing that local party organization is quite power-
ful if we understand local parties as informal networks of office holders, interest group leaders, 
activists, consultants, and the like). 
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will refer to as ‘Friends and Allies.’”22  While “applaud[ing] the efforts 
of these organizations to augment the traditional political party infra-
structure,” the report insists “it is clear that the RNC has a central and 
critical role to play in leading our Party forward.”23 
If the networked nature of contemporary parties complicates claims 
of centralization, it also points to what is in fact notably absent from, 
and in tension with, Kramer’s account: the two parties’ increasing  
ideological coherence and polarization.  If in the mid–twentieth centu-
ry party affiliation and ideology traveled separately, in the early  
twenty-first century they travel together, and the parties have grown 
ever more polarized.24  Much of this transformation follows from the 
party realignment of the South, a decades-long shift initiated as early 
as the New Deal and spurred in particular by the Voting Rights Act of 
1965,25 during which conservative Southern Democrats moved to the 
Republican Party and liberal, mostly Northern, Republicans embraced 
the Democratic Party.26  The alignment of partisanship and ideolo-
gy — and the concomitant reduction, if not elimination, of regional 
party difference27 — occurred with respect to both state and national 
parties.28  Today’s party networks are also both a cause and an effect 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 22 REPUBLICAN NAT’L COMM., GROWTH & OPPORTUNITY PROJECT 44 (2013). 
 23 Id.; see also id. at 49 (“Chairman Priebus should call for a command performance meeting 
of the leadership of our friends and allies and not allow anyone to leave the room until it’s deter-
mined, to the extent allowed by law, who is doing what that can be divided legally.”). 
 24 See, e.g., Pildes, supra note 12, at 275 (“American democracy over the last generation has 
had one defining attribute: the rise of extreme partisan polarization.”); see also ABRAMOWITZ, 
supra note 12; ALDRICH, supra note 12; NOLAN MCCARTY ET AL., POLARIZED AMERICA 
(2006); Bawn et al., supra note 20, at 582 fig.3; Layman et al., supra note 12. 
 25 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973 to 1973bb-1 (2006 & Supp. V 2011). 
 26 See, e.g., EARL BLACK & MERLE BLACK, THE RISE OF SOUTHERN REPUBLICANS 72–
113 (2002); GREEN ET AL., supra note 6, at 140–63; Pildes, supra note 12, at 287–97; see also Paul 
Frymer, Debating the Causes of Party Polarization in America, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 335 (2011) 
(tracing the Southern realignment following the Voting Rights Act to a broad set of historical 
forces from the civil rights movement).  From the late nineteenth century until the late twentieth 
century, the South had a one-party system.  Laws and practices that disenfranchised large por-
tions of the electorate locked the Democratic Party in power, and even after the Voting Rights Act 
increased access to the vote, robust two-party competition did not emerge until the 1980s and 
1990s.  During the century of artificial one-party rule, Southern Democrats differed significantly 
from Northern Democrats, and largely because of the Democratic Party’s lock on the South, the 
Republican Party was also more ideologically diverse.  Liberal and moderate Democrats thus of-
ten had more in common with liberal and moderate Republicans than with conservative Demo-
crats.  See generally ALAN I. ABRAMOWITZ, THE POLARIZED PUBLIC? 13–15, 42–45 (2013); 
ALDRICH, supra note 12, at 209, 248, 253, 311–12; GREEN ET AL., supra note 6, at 163. 
 27 See generally NICOLE MELLOW, THE STATE OF DISUNION (2008) (exploring how region-
al divisions shape national partisan politics).  
 28 See, e.g., Boris Shor & Nolan McCarty, The Ideological Mapping of American Legislatures, 
105 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 530, 549–50 (2011) (“[T]he states appear to follow the national pattern of 
high and growing [party] polarization.”); see also Robert S. Erikson et al., Public Opinion in the 
States: A Quarter Century of Change and Stability, in PUBLIC OPINION IN STATE POLITICS 
229, 238, 246 (Jeffrey E. Cohen ed., 2006) (“During the late 1970s, there is little obvious connec-
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of party cohesion and polarization.  The rise of allied interest groups 
has made the parties more ideologically distinct, as these groups have 
pushed the parties to take positions on divisive issues, such as abor-
tion, global warming, and gay rights,29 that have shaped both national 
and state elections.30  And the ideological distinctiveness of the parties 
has, in turn, fostered interest group alliances with them. 
The relationship between centralization and ideological coherence 
is thus quite different from that posited by Kramer and his predeces-
sors.  In an era of “antiparties,”31 intraparty difference facilitated de-
centralization, while decentralization amplified difference.32  But in 
today’s world of more ideologically cohesive, polarized parties, decen-
tralization does not yield the same marked divergence: individuals and 
organizations throughout the networked party advance similar ends. 
Although this understanding of the parties as ideologically cohesive 
and polarized is in tension with Kramer’s view of them as 
nonprogrammatic, it bolsters his claim that partisanship generates 
thick ties between state and national politicians.  Kramer argues that 
party affiliation creates a sense of comradeship among fellow parti-
sans, yet his account of nonprogrammatic, nonideological parties raises 
questions about the strength of intraparty camaraderie.33  Cohesive, 
polarized parties furnish a stronger basis for such camaraderie.  They 
might, however, raise a new question: Is partisanship still the relevant 
variable?  In Kramer’s account, the role of partisanship was clear: if a 
politician’s party ID did not correspond to her views on particular is-
sues or her overarching ideology, it was partisanship as such that led 
her to respect the desires of her copartisans.  But if parties are ideolog-
ically identified, the work of partisanship is less obvious.  Perhaps pol-
iticians cooperate — and, as I will discuss below, compete — because 
of particular ideological commitments, and partisanship simply maps 
onto this deeper-seated motivation? 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
tion between the partisanship of American states and their ideological preferences,” id. at 238, 
“[but] [t]oday ideology and partisanship generally reinforce each other, so that states are either 
Democratic and liberal or Republican and conservative,” id. at 246.). 
 29 See, e.g., Bawn et al., supra note 20, at 580–81; Layman et al., supra note 12, at 96–100; see 
also Frymer, supra note 26, at 339–40; A. James Reichley, The Rise of National Parties, in THE 
NEW DIRECTION IN AMERICAN POLITICS 175, 196–97 (John E. Chubb & Paul E. Peterson 
eds., 1985). 
 30 See, e.g., Calabresi, supra note 18, at 798.  These issues have even shaped officially nonpar-
tisan municipal elections.  Sarah Palin notoriously won election as the Mayor of Wasilla by bran-
dishing her “passion for Republican ideology,” including on such hot-button issues as abortion, 
gun rights, and the place of religion in public life.  William Yardley, Palin Start: Politics Not as 
Usual, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 3, 2008, at A1. 
 31 GRODZINS, supra note 8, at 284.  
 32 See, e.g., id. at 255–70 (arguing that, because members of Congress could not be corralled by 
party solidarity or discipline to focus on a party agenda, they often deferred to local concerns). 
 33 Kramer, supra note 13, at 1539, 1542. 
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Although ideology matters too, partisanship is not epiphenomenal.  
As I will describe further in Part II, once individuals associate with a 
political party — whether because of their ideological predispositions, 
their membership in particular social groups, or often the overlap be-
tween the two34 — partisanship is a powerful, stable identification that 
shapes how they process information and what they believe.35  Today’s 
cohesive parties inform people’s “most abstract and enduring beliefs 
about society and public affairs,”36 as well as their short-term political 
evaluations and views on discrete issues.37  Studies have shown, for 
example, that attitudes toward social policies depend on the stated po-
sition of the political parties even when these positions run counter to 
individuals’ ideological beliefs.38  And as party positions on issues 
crystallize, individuals’ partisanship can reshape even their preexisting 
beliefs.39 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 34 The debate in the political science literature about the causes of partisan identification, 
compare, e.g., ABRAMOWITZ, supra note 12 (ideology), with, e.g., GREEN ET AL., supra note 6 
(social groups), is often overstated insofar as social groups and ideologies are overlapping, mutual-
ly constitutive sources of party identification.  Cf. MICHAEL WALZER, POLITICS AND PASSION 
93 (2004) (“Socialization in the family, the earliest form of political education, is just agitprop with 
love.”). 
 35 See generally GREEN ET AL., supra note 6; ROSENBLUM, supra note 6; Thomas M. Carsey 
& Geoffrey C. Layman, Changing Sides or Changing Minds? Party Identification and Policy 
Preferences in the American Electorate, 50 AM. J. POL. SCI. 464 (2006). 
 36 Paul Goren, Party Identification and Core Political Values, 49 AM. J. POL. SCI. 881, 894 
(2005); see also id. at 895 (noting that these include beliefs about equal opportunity, limited gov-
ernment, and moral tolerance). 
 37 See, e.g., Larry M. Bartels, Beyond the Running Tally: Partisan Bias in Political Percep-
tions, 24 POL. BEHAV. 117, 120 (2002); Carsey & Layman, supra note 35, at 475; Holbrook & La 
Raja, supra note 19, at 74–75.  
 38 See, e.g., Geoffrey L. Cohen, Party over Policy: The Dominating Impact of Group Influence 
on Political Beliefs, 85 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 808, 811 (2003) (showing, for exam-
ple, that liberal Democrats supported a harsh welfare program when told Democrats supported it, 
and conservative Republicans supported a generous one when told Republicans supported it). 
 39 As the parties assumed distinct positions on abortion after Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 
(1973), for instance, a significant number of elected officials and voters changed their views to 
align with their party’s position.  See, e.g., Geoffrey C. Layman & Thomas M. Carsey, Party Po-
larization and “Conflict Extension” in the American Electorate, 46 AM. J. POL. SCI. 786 (2002).  
The reverse can also occur: policy preferences may lead one to identify with a different party if 
the issue is significant enough.  But the influence of partisanship on policy preferences is usually 
greater than the reverse.  See, e.g., Carsey & Layman, supra note 35, at 474 (“[W]e find: issue-
based party conversion on some particularly powerful, emotional, and polarizing issues only 
among individuals who are aware of party differences on the issue and who attach particular sa-
lience to it.  Yet, even in this group, there is evidence of individuals changing their policy attitudes 
in response to their party affiliations.  Furthermore, among those aware of party differences on an 
issue but for whom the issue is not salient, the only observable effect is of party-based change in 
issue attitudes.”); see also, e.g., GREEN ET AL., supra note 6, at 141 (noting that the Voting Rights 
Act was an “exogenous shock to the electoral system” that ultimately produced a party realign-
ment, but stressing that half of the Southern realignment followed from cohort replacement and 
that individual changes in party affiliation occurred very gradually). 
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At the level of groups and institutions, moreover, partisanship has 
distinct organizational force.  There is, as an initial matter, a corollary 
of partisanship’s role in shaping individuals’ beliefs: parties do not 
simply reflect cleavages that already exist in society; they make issues 
salient at particular points in time, and they connect issues to generate 
related fronts of policy disagreement.40  Moreover, state and federal 
politicians are readily identifiable to themselves and others as mem-
bers of political parties, and this membership makes it easy to affiliate, 
including across the state-federal divide.  Perhaps most critically, party 
organizations and their “Friends and Allies” work throughout the  
nation to elect fellow partisans — and to raise and distribute funds — 
in furtherance of party agendas.41  There are, thus, calculating and 
strategic, as well as affective and identity-based, reasons why partisan-
ship shapes elected officials’ positions and generates intraparty  
camaraderie. 
If party politics undergirds cooperation between state and federal 
officials of the same party, however, so too does it undergird competi-
tion between state and federal officials of different parties — a dynam-
ic absent from, and in some tension with, Kramer’s account.  In a time 
of ideologically cohesive, polarized parties, state governments furnish a 
critical platform for the party out of power to fight the party in power 
at the national level. 
2.  Federalism. — State challenges to the federal government are a 
staple of federalism doctrine and scholarship.  In its oft-quoted  
catalogue of federalism’s values, for instance, Gregory v. Ashcroft42 in-
vokes such state checks as “[p]erhaps the principal benefit of the fed-
eralist system.”43  While, as in Gregory, the literature usually focuses 
on how states may stop the federal government from overreaching, it 
recognizes the force of states’ affirmative challenges as well.  States, on 
this view, check the federal government not only by obstructing its ac-
tions but also by formulating opposing policies and putting them into 
practice.44 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 40 ROSENBLUM, supra note 6, at 365–66. 
 41 See, e.g., Pildes, supra note 12, at 325; Ciara Torres-Spelliscy, The $500 Million Question: Are 
the Democratic and Republican Governors Associations Really State PACs Under Buckley’s Major 
Purpose Test?, 15 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 485, 502–05 (2012); REDMAP 2012 Summary 
Report, REPUBLICAN ST. LEADERSHIP COMMITTEE  (Jan. 4, 2013), http://rslc.com/_blog/News 
/post/REDMAP_2012_Summary_Report; see also infra section IV.A, pp. 1135–42. 
 42 501 U.S. 452 (1991). 
 43 Id. at 458; see also, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 
1425, 1493–506 (1987); Deborah Jones Merritt, The Guarantee Clause and State Autonomy: Fed-
eralism for a Third Century, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 4 (1988). 
 44 See, e.g., Bond v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2355, 2364 (2011) (stating that federalism serves 
individual liberty both by limiting the power of the federal government and by empowering states 
to enact their own “positive law”). 
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As Daryl Levinson has argued, however, our classic accounts fail to 
describe why states would check the federal government.45  Today’s 
polarized parties furnish an explanation.  The state and federal gov-
ernments may not themselves be “self-interested political actors with 
empire-building ambitions, pitted against each other in a competition 
for power,” as Levinson criticizes federalism doctrine and scholarship 
for assuming,46 but this is a decent description of the partisan officials 
who populate them.47  And as Democratic and Republican politicians 
compete to gain power and implement partisan agendas, federalism 
provides critical infrastructure for their conflict.  In a nation with fifty 
states, a sizeable number are always governed by the party out of 
power at the national level.48  Currently, twenty-three states have Re-
publican governors and legislatures, while thirteen have Democratic 
governors and legislatures.49  States governed by the party out of pow-
er in Washington seek both to obstruct federal policy and also to  
challenge it through their affirmative acts.  With ideologically  
cohesive, polarized parties that operate at both the state and national 
level, federalism furnishes a consistent forum for party conflict, and 
such conflict need not involve all fifty states for its effects to be felt  
nationwide. 
If partisanship motivates state challenges that conventional federal-
ism doctrine and scholarship often take for granted, however, it also 
affects the nature of these challenges.  The same accounts that paint 
states and the federal government as empire-building, self-interested 
actors tend to characterize state checks as emanating from states’  
distinctiveness and distance from the federal government.  The cen-
trality of partisanship instead points to contestation grounded in over-
lap and integration.  Party politics means that state opposition need 
not be based on something essentially “state” rather than “national.”  
Instead of representing distinctively state interests against the distinc-
tively national interests of the federal government, states may partici-
pate in substantive controversies that are national in scope.  Partisan 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 45 See Levinson, supra note 4, at 944. 
 46 Id.   
 47 While Levinson has addressed the role of polarized political parties with respect to the sepa-
ration of powers, see, e.g., id. at 959, he has not considered how they affect our federal system, 
even as he has argued that “contingent empirical characteristics of the political process” determine 
the “allocation of policy space between the federal and state governments,” id. at 943. 
 48 See infra pp. 1096–97 (discussing complications of deeming one party “in power” or “out of 
power”). 
 49 See Governors & Partisan Splits 2013, STATESIDE ASSOCIATES, http://www.stateside.com 
/governors-partisan-splits-2013 (last updated Nov. 22, 2013).  In 2013, twenty-five states also had 
veto-proof legislative supermajorities, including three states with divided governments.  See 
Gregory Korte, One-Party Dominance Grows in States, USA TODAY, Dec. 14, 2012, at A6. 
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federalism underscores that “the national” is not defined by Washing-
ton alone.50 
This nationalist dimension of partisan federalism informs both the 
nature of state actions and the actors involved.  It means, first, that 
state opposition does not necessarily arise from or insist upon dual 
sovereignty, the idea that the states must enjoy a legally defined sphere 
of exclusive authority.  To be sure, states sometimes contest federal 
policy by arguing that the federal government has acted in excess of its 
powers and encroached on state prerogatives, and partisanship offers a 
good clue to when state actors make these claims.  But states also con-
test federal policy by enacting competing laws in the same regulatory 
area and administering federal law uncooperatively.51  This point does 
not reduce federalism to simple decentralization — such actions de-
pend on state officials elected and appointed independently of the fed-
eral government — but it does call attention to the ways states level 
challenges while governing in domains also occupied by the federal 
government. 
Second, partisanship disaggregates support for state versus federal 
power from state versus federal actors.  If partisanship, not something 
about states qua states, motivates state challenges to the federal gov-
ernment, it follows that both state and federal actors may support  
these challenges.  Party politics thus helps explain why, at any given 
time, we see some states cheerleading exercises of federal power and 
some of the staunchest proponents of state power sitting in Washing-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 50 In a recent paper, James Gardner argues that the national parties have “colonize[d]” state 
politics and that this undermines the states’ ability to dissent from national political decisions.  
James A. Gardner, The Myth of State Autonomy: Federalism, Political Parties, and the National 
Colonization of State Politics, 29 J.L. & POL. 1, 17 (2013) (internal quotation marks omitted).  But 
partisanship, which Gardner invokes only as a source of convergence, is also a powerful source of 
disagreement.  Party politics means there is not one national political agenda that exists either at 
the federal level or, through colonization, at the state level.  There are competing political agen-
das.  And the states provide a forum for partisan competition, as states controlled by one party 
push back against the federal government controlled by the other.  Although this disagreement is 
not based on something specifically “state” versus something specifically “national,” American 
federalism has always been, in part, about presenting different, competing versions of the national 
will.  The absence of “a distinctive state political agenda” need not interfere with states’ ability to 
“dissent from or to affect in any meaningful way the course of national policy making,” as  
Gardner suggests.  Id. at 43.  When states disagree with the federal government’s policy decisions 
and advance a different national position, that too is federalism at work.  Gardner’s related con-
cern — that the colonization of state politics inhibits the range of positions that state actors are 
capable of imagining and advancing — seems to me a deeper one, but one that has to do less with 
values of contestation and checking and more with values such as diversity and self-
determination.  I offer some tentative thoughts about partisanship’s intersection with these values 
in Part III.  While not denying the possibility that if states give effect to a vision of the national 
will, their ability to represent more particularistic interests may be concomitantly reduced, I sug-
gest that partisan federalism need not entail top-down colonization and centralization. 
 51 See Jessica Bulman-Pozen & Heather K. Gerken, Essay, Uncooperative Federalism, 118 
YALE L.J. 1256 (2009). 
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ton — and why this does not mark the end of federalism.  Doctrine 
and scholarship often gloss over the way in which debates about state 
versus federal power function as proxies for substantive policy dis-
putes,52 but partisanship suggests that a derivative, contingent at-
tachment to state power need not diminish the force of federalism’s 
check.  For federalism to facilitate opposition, only some states must 
challenge the federal government, and partisanship explains both why 
some states will cast their lot with the federal government and why 
others will oppose its actions.  Partisanship similarly reveals why some 
federal politicians will be enamored of state authority: their party is in 
the minority at the national level.53 
In this sense, Kramer’s insight that party affiliation aligns the in-
terests of federal politicians with their state counterparts remains a 
powerful one.  But there is a twist: state and federal politicians alike 
will champion state or federal action depending on the partisan com-
position of Congress and the presidency.  While Kramer understood 
partisanship to serve state officials’ inherent interest in protecting state 
power, this Article suggests that federalism serves both some state and 
some federal officials’ interest in advancing partisan goals.  Certain 
federal representatives favor the states not simply because they have 
connections to state officials (who may themselves welcome national 
intervention), but also because they cannot achieve their partisan ob-
jectives at the national level. 
Indeed, federalism offers more opportunities for each party to af-
firmatively advance its objectives than does the separation of powers, 
which has received attention as a framework for partisan competi-
tion.54  While the national separation of powers hinges on the assent of 
multiple actors who constitute a single government, federalism de-
pends on the diversity of multiple actors who constitute different gov-
ernments.  The same partisan dynamics that yield gridlock in Wash-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 52 But see Ernest A. Young, Welcome to the Dark Side: Liberals Rediscover Federalism in the 
Wake of the War on Terror, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 1277, 1279 (2004) (defending opportunistic feder-
alism); cf. Lynn A. Baker, Putting the Safeguards Back into the Political Safeguards of Federal-
ism, 46 VILL. L. REV. 951, 955 (2001) (critiquing process federalism for allowing “a majority of 
states [to] impose their own policy preferences on a minority of states”). 
 53 See George A. Krause & Ann O’M. Bowman, Adverse Selection, Political Parties, and Poli-
cy Delegation in the American Federal System, 21 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 359, 363 (2005) (“[A]s par-
tisan congruence among national level political institutions increases, the incentive to shift power 
to subnational counterparts decreases . . . .”). 
 54 See Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not Powers, 119 HARV. 
L. REV. 2311 (2006) (arguing that our cohesive, polarized parties are the real force behind the sep-
aration or unification of powers in our system and that whether we have a system that involves 
competition between the President and Congress thus depends on whether the legislative and ex-
ecutive branches are divided by party).  Today’s partisanship, in fact, seems to yield perpetually 
divided government, as even party-unified government generates gridlock in an era of the filibus-
ter and other minority-empowering procedural tools. 
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ington may thus yield differentiated action in the states.  If the minori-
ty party can more readily veto the majority’s choices from within the 
federal government, it can more readily instantiate an opposing view 
from the states.55  Comparing federalism and the separation of powers 
in this way, however, threatens to obscure a more significant point: 
federalism and the separation of powers are interlocking systems.56  
National and state actors alike turn to both national and state institu-
tions to advance their partisan agendas.57 
3.  Origins. — Before exploring contemporary examples of partisan 
federalism, a very brief historical note is in order.  I have suggested 
that political actors’ use of both state and federal governments to ar-
ticulate and amplify competition between the political parties is a re-
cent phenomenon following, in particular, from the rise of ideologically 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 55 To be sure, unilateral action is possible at the national level.  Faced with legislative gridlock, 
for instance, the President can act on his own.  But in so doing, he is generally understood to be 
eschewing, if not violating, a tenet of constitutional checks and balances — that the assent of mul-
tiple branches is required before the government may act.  Oppositional, affirmative acts by 
states, in contrast, are widely understood as a component of federalism’s check.  At the same time, 
state governments face their own separation of powers–related obstructionism; even unified party 
government does not ensure the dominant party’s ability to enact its agenda.  But the prevalence 
of unified party government and legislative supermajorities makes affirmative acts easier at the 
state level. 
 56 See generally Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Federalism as a Safeguard of the Separation of Powers, 
112 COLUM. L. REV. 459 (2012) [hereinafter Bulman-Pozen, Federalism as a Safeguard].  My pre-
vious work focused on how the states may limit federal executive power in an era of executive 
dominance, though some recent developments — in particular, the use of waivers in cooperative 
federalism programs, which seems likely only to increase in the wake of National Federation of 
Independent Business v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012), see Samuel R. Bagenstos, Federalism by 
Waiver After the Health Care Case, in THE HEALTH CARE CASE 227, 227 (Nathaniel Persily, 
Gillian E. Metzger & Trevor W. Morrison eds., 2013) — raise questions about collusion between 
states and the federal executive.  For some initial thoughts, see Jessica Bulman-Pozen, From Sov-
ereignty and Process to Administration and Politics: The Afterlife of American Federalism, 123 
YALE L.J. (forthcoming Apr. 2014). 
 57 Although my aim is not to intervene in the process federalism debate, the account I have 
sketched here suggests that process federalism’s proponents may be overlooking the most signifi-
cant political safeguard of federalism: it is not the relationship between state and federal officials 
as a general matter, but rather the role of the minority party within the federal government.  As I 
have argued, Kramer’s process federalism assumes that state politicians will seek to protect state 
autonomy and that federal politicians will respect state politicians’ interests, but it is not clear 
why state politicians will themselves seek to protect state autonomy.  See supra note 18.  Indeed, 
taking partisan politics seriously suggests that they often will not; substantive political interests 
will shape whether state politicians prefer state or federal action.  But if taking partisan politics 
seriously challenges our existing political safeguards account, it also calls attention to a largely 
overlooked phenomenon: the minority party at the national level will opportunistically seek to 
protect state autonomy.  Pointing to the minority party’s incentives does not, in itself, resolve 
whether political safeguards suffice, but it does alter the questions we should be asking, under-
scoring, for instance, the ways in which federalism’s safeguards are bound up in the separation of 
powers and intrabranch dynamics within the national government.  Cf. Bradford R. Clark, Sepa-
ration of Powers as a Safeguard of Federalism, 79 TEX. L. REV. 1321 (2001) (arguing that the sep-
aration of powers protects state autonomy by limiting the types of federal lawmaking that may 
displace state law). 
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cohesive, polarized parties in the late twentieth century.  Yet partisan 
federalism has deep roots.  In the early Republic, two emergent, polar-
ized parties similarly turned to state governments to stage national 
partisan conflict.  Consider, for instance, the Virginia and Kentucky 
Resolutions responding to the Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798.58  Often 
invoked as a seminal moment in American federalism, this state re-
sistance reflected, as much as anything, the use of state governments 
by national and state actors alike to wage partisan battle.59 
The Acts were Federalist legislation opposed by Republicans at 
both the national and state levels and supported by Federalists at both 
the national and state levels.60  While the Republican position was 
most clearly advanced by Virginia and Kentucky, the states’ Resolu-
tions were ghostwritten by James Madison and Thomas Jefferson at a 
time when Jefferson was Vice President and Madison had recently re-
tired from Congress (and was soon to become Jefferson’s Secretary of 
State).  And while Virginia and Kentucky maintained that the national 
government had overreached, the other states — governed by Federal-
ists — declined to join the cry against federal usurpation and sided 
with the national government.61 
Although Madison’s role in the Alien and Sedition Acts controversy 
in part reflects his conversion from a nationalist to a states’ rights 
supporter, this dichotomous framing risks overstating the tension be-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 58 James Madison, Virginia Resolutions of 1798, reprinted in 4 THE DEBATES IN THE SEV-
ERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 528 
(Jonathan Elliot ed., 1836) [hereinafter ELLIOT’S DEBATES]; Thomas Jefferson, Kentucky Reso-
lutions of 1798 and 1799, reprinted in 4 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra, at 540. 
 59 Cf. Josh Chafetz, Multiplicity in Federalism and the Separation of Powers, 120 YALE L.J. 
1084, 1111 (2011) (reviewing ALISON L. LACROIX, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF 
AMERICAN FEDERALISM (2010)) (“Ultimately, the debate over the Kentucky and Virginia Reso-
lutions was a debate over the ability and authority of the states to serve as loci of protest against 
unconstitutional and oppressive federal laws.  The political branches of the states, serving as a 
competing power source to the federal political branches, organized opposition using the rhetoric 
of sovereignty.”). 
 60 See, e.g., RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE IDEA OF A PARTY SYSTEM 112 (1969) (“The 
[Virginia and Kentucky] resolutions were, above all, party propaganda, but propaganda resting on 
a regional power base . . . .”).  As Richard Hofstadter’s framing underscores, party positions have 
themselves been informed by regional interests.  Moreover, because regions have no legal exist-
ence as such, regional interests have been advanced in state fora.  A main cleavage between the 
Federalists and Republicans thus concerned the respective power of state and national govern-
ments.  But, importantly, this commitment to state or federal power became a matter of party 
identification rather than following from an actor’s state or national role.  Cf. DAVID 
WALDSTREICHER, IN THE MIDST OF PERPETUAL FETES 246–93 (1997) (arguing that regional 
political identities emerged together with party politics in the early Republic, and that New Eng-
land, the South, and the West each contested particular federal policies while claiming to repre-
sent the real United States, rendering regionalism a nationalist form of dissent). 
 61 See, e.g., Answer of the State of Delaware, in 4 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 58, at 532 
(arguing that “the resolutions from the state of Virginia” constituted an “unjustifiable interference 
with the general government”). 
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tween nationalism and federalism.  Madison’s turn to the state legisla-
tures gave concrete meaning to his earlier suggestion in the Federalist 
Papers that the states could articulate a competing vision of the na-
tional will.62  Many of the means by which he suggested the American 
people might use the states to check the national government sound in 
shared authority and mutual dependence rather than separation, and 
he argued that the states would be most effective when they acted to-
gether, as the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions urged without suc-
cess.63  In his National Gazette essays, Madison similarly resisted view-
ing the states as sites of distinct “interests and affections,” but he 
insisted that maintaining the states as separate sites of government 
power was necessary to preserve the accountability of the national 
government to the people.64 
Madison’s role in drafting the Virginia Resolution and the later 
Virginia Report underscores not only American federalism’s longstand-
ing nationalist dimension, but also its longstanding opportunistic di-
mension.65  Federalism divides power and offers a structure for sub-
stantive views to compete.  It does not specify what the recipients of 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 62 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 46, at 294 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 2003); THE 
FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison), supra, at 322–23; see also 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE 
THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 185–86 (1991); SAMUEL H. BEER, TO MAKE A NATION 21 
(1993) (“[On this Madisonian view the] states are not rival communities carved out of the greater 
jurisdiction which . . . seek to act on an exclusive and inward-looking concern for their distinct 
interests.  Like the federal government, state governments also express the national will.”); Barry 
Friedman, Valuing Federalism, 82 MINN. L. REV. 317, 403 (1997); Larry D. Kramer, Lecture, 
“The Interest of the Man”: James Madison, Popular Constitutionalism, and the Theory of Delib-
erative Democracy, 41 VAL. U. L. REV. 697, 706 n.19 (2006). 
 63 See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 46 (James Madison), supra note 62, at 297; see also BEER, 
supra note 62, at 387–88; James S. Liebman & Brandon L. Garrett, Madisonian Equal Protection, 
104 COLUM. L. REV. 837, 909–12, 957–62 (2004). 
 64 James Madison, Consolidation, NAT’L GAZETTE, Dec. 3, 1791, reprinted in 14 THE PA-
PERS OF JAMES MADISON 137, 138 (Robert A. Rutland et al. eds., 1983).  Recognizing the inevi-
tability of political parties, Madison’s contemporaneous writings suggest that their evil could be 
combated by “making one party a check on the other” — an idea not dissimilar to his view of 
state-federal relations.  James Madison, Parties, NAT’L GAZETTE, Jan 23, 1792, reprinted in 14 
THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON, supra, at 197.  This is not, however, to suggest that Madison 
cheerfully welcomed the actual party competition he saw unfolding.  See, e.g., James Madison, A 
Candid State of Parties, NAT’L GAZETTE, Sept. 22, 1792, reprinted in 14 THE PAPERS OF 
JAMES MADISON, supra, at 370. 
 65 See Young, supra note 52, at 1308–09 (“[O]pportunism seems to be exactly what our Found-
ers expected — and counted upon . . . . The most reliable ‘political safeguard of federalism’ in the 
Founders’ scheme . . . is that whenever a particular federal measure is proposed, the people op-
posed to that measure on its policy merits will have an incentive to argue that the matter should 
be left to the States.”).  See generally DAVID M. POTTER, The Historian’s Use of Nationalism and 
Vice Versa, in HISTORY AND AMERICAN SOCIETY 60, 99 (Don E. Fehrenbacher ed., 1973) 
(“Scratch a spokesman of state sovereignty and you find . . . almost invariably a man who sees 
that he is outnumbered; look beneath the rhetoric which exalts federal supremacy and you dis-
cover a motive on the part of a majority group to remove some irksome restriction upon the use of 
power.”).  
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divided power should use it for, nor does it equate particular views 
with one level of government or the other.66  Claims that political ac-
tors undermine federalism by marshaling arguments for state power in 
an opportunistic way and treating federalism as a convenient ar-
rangement through which to pursue policy agendas indict our Found-
ers as well as contemporary politicians.  More deeply, such claims 
overlook the significance of federalism in establishing loci of political 
conflict, whether this conflict is driven by state institutional interests, 
partisanship, or something else.  While the specifics of the arrangement 
are mutable, the fact that states exist as separate sites of governance 
means political conflict will be channeled through them.67 
B.  State Opposition to the Federal Government 
If the account of partisan federalism I have offered so far is correct, 
we can expect that party politics will lead states to challenge the fed-
eral government.  Not all the states, and not the whole federal gov-
ernment — rather, those states that have a partisan affiliation different 
from the dominant party at the federal level.  These states will likely 
find allies within the federal government along party lines, and they 
will themselves be opposed not only by portions of the federal gov-
ernment but also by other states.  Is this, in fact, what we see?  While 
partisanship cannot explain all state opposition, it captures a good deal 
of what happens on the ground.  Below, I outline three main ways that 
states and their federal allies contest national policy: they argue that 
the federal government is exceeding its authority and encroaching on 
state autonomy; they enact their own legislation to prod the federal 
government into action or to set a different course; and they adminis-
ter federal programs in ways that interfere with federal goals. 
Before describing such challenges, an important caveat is in order.  
I have suggested here that state and federal governments are “con-
trolled” by one party or the other.  That simple formulation obscures a 
very messy reality, of course, especially during periods of divided gov-
ernment.  Which party is deemed dominant varies not only across 
time, but also across issues and forms of governance.  Although I 
sometimes address the partisan composition of Congress, my discus-
sion of the national level focuses on the President.  This is not only for 
purposes of narrative economy.  Although the President’s control over 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 66 See Young, supra note 52, at 1311. 
 67 See, e.g., Andrzej Rapaczynski, From Sovereignty to Process: The Jurisprudence of Federal-
ism After Garcia, 1985 SUP. CT. REV. 341, 386–88; David B. Truman, Federalism and the Party 
System, in AMERICAN FEDERALISM IN PERSPECTIVE 81, 89 (Aaron Wildavsky ed., 1967); cf. 
Chafetz, supra note 59, at 1124 n.242 (maintaining that the virtue of the separation of powers 
scheme is that it “creates opportunities within the governing structure for the representation of 
different interests, thus allowing for the possibility of conflict” (emphases omitted)). 
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the federal government is far from complete, his relative power over 
the administrative apparatus and his ability to push (or veto) a legisla-
tive agenda matter, as do media-fed popular perceptions that the Pres-
ident is in charge.  The public’s tendency to overstate the President’s 
power itself shapes partisan competition in important ways.68  Similar 
questions arise about which party is dominant at the state level; de-
pending on the type of state action involved, I focus on either execu-
tive or legislative actors.69  To make the broad-strokes argument, I do 
not always address these details in the text, but the footnotes provide a 
little more texture. 
1.  Litigation: State Sovereignty. — The classic account of state 
power hinges on sovereignty, the authority of the state to govern in its 
own sphere without federal interference.  Although sovereignty is not a 
necessary predicate for state resistance,70 it is nonetheless a powerful 
resource for resistance; indeed, claims of dual sovereignty may have 
expressive value in preserving the states as counterbalances to the fed-
eral government even when those claims fail.71  It is not obvious why 
state officials would defend state sovereignty,72 but partisanship ex-
plains why at least some state officials — and some federal officials — 
are motivated to do so: their party is outnumbered at the national lev-
el.  Even for state actors who might often have incentives to embrace 
national policymaking, that is, state sovereignty looks good when their 
party is out of power in Washington.  And their copartisans in the fed-
eral government may similarly find themselves defending state power 
from federal encroachment.  Sovereigntism is, on this account, an epi-
phenomenon of partisanship. 
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act73 (Affordable Care 
Act) offers a clear illustration of this dynamic.  The Act passed Con-
gress with only Democratic votes.74  Upon its enactment, Republicans 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 68 See also infra Part II, pp. 1108–22 (discussing the relevance of this perception for partisan 
identification with states). 
 69 At the state level, unified party government is currently prevalent.  See, e.g., Governors & 
Partisan Splits 2013, supra note 49 (showing that a supermajority of states have unified govern-
ment).  States do, however, present an additional possibility of divided government: an attorney 
general of a different party from the governor.  Compare id., with Attorneys General, STATESIDE 
ASSOCIATES, http://www.stateside.com/attorneys-general-2013 (last updated Sept. 6, 2013).   
 70 See, e.g., Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, supra note 51, at 1309, 1312. 
 71 See, e.g., Adam B. Cox, Expressivism in Federalism: A New Defense of the Anti-
Commandeering Rule?, 33 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1309 (2000); Vicki C. Jackson, Federalism and the 
Uses and Limits of Law: Printz and Principle?, 111 HARV. L. REV. 2180, 2218–28 (1998). 
 72 See, e.g., Levinson, supra note 4; supra note 18. 
 73 Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 
and 42 U.S.C.). 
 74 For a detailed partisan history, see Vincent L. Frakes, Essay, Partisanship and 
(Un)Compromise: A Study of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 49 HARV. J. ON 
LEGIS. 135, 136–41 (2012).  
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immediately called for repeal, with one Republican House member 
threatening to “meet the federal government at the state line to keep 
them from mandating this bill upon us.”75  A group of states also 
quickly sued to enjoin the law on the ground that it exceeded Con-
gress’s powers and intruded on state sovereignty.  While this was a 
classic federalism argument, not all states signed on.  The split was 
perfectly partisan.  Republican officials representing twenty-seven 
states argued that the law violated state sovereignty, while Democratic 
officials representing thirteen states defended the exercise of federal 
power.76  Federal officials also made claims about state sovereignty 
versus national power according to party affiliation.  Most notably, 
Republican senators joined Republican state officials in arguing that 
the Act’s individual mandate intruded on state sovereignty.77  The Su-
preme Court’s ruling upholding the Act has not ended the debate but 
simply moved it to the legislative and administrative realms: House 
Republicans have voted repeatedly for repeal and denials of funds to 
administer the Act,78 and Republican governors and especially Repub-
lican state legislators are refusing to set up insurance exchanges and to 
participate in the Medicaid expansion on partisan grounds.79 
The constitutional debate over the Affordable Care Act encapsu-
lates partisan federalism.  We see a fight about federalism involving 
both state and federal actors, but arguments for state versus federal 
authority map not onto the actor’s state or federal office but rather on-
to his or her party affiliation.  Insofar as partisanship motivates posi-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 75 Lee Fang, Extreme Right Wing of GOP Leads Health Reform Repeal Effort, Pledges to  
Repeal ‘the Whole Thing,’ THINKPROGRESS (Mar. 23, 2010, 9:55 AM), http://thinkprogress 
.org/politics/2010/03/23/88084/repeal-whole-thing (quoting then–Tennessee Representative Zach 
Wamp). 
 76 See Robert N. Weiner, Much Ado: The Potential Impact of the Supreme Court Decision Up-
holding the Affordable Care Act, in THE HEALTH CARE CASE, supra note 56, at 69, 69–72 (de-
scribing the partisan lineup and discussing intrastate disputes between Democratic attorneys gen-
eral and Republican governors and vice versa); see also Kevin Sack, In Partisan Battle, 
Governors Clash with Attorneys General over Lawsuits, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 28, 2010, at A25 (de-
scribing intrastate conflicts between governors and attorneys general of different parties). 
 77 Brief of Members of the United States Senate as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents 
on the Minimum Coverage Provision Issue at 8, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs. v. Florida, 
132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012) (No. 11-398) (arguing that the law “invad[es] the legitimate province of the 
States”). 
 78 See, e.g., Jeremy W. Peters, House to Vote Yet Again on Health Care Repeal, N.Y. TIMES, 
May 15, 2013, at A14.  
 79 See, e.g., Kyle Cheney & Jason Millman, Medicaid Expansion Stalls in Red States, POLIT-
ICO (May 2, 2013, 6:25 PM), http://www.politico.com/story/2013/05/medicaid-expansion-stalls 
-in-red-states-90878.html; GOP Governors Reject ObamaCare Health Exchange Partnerships, 
FOX NEWS (Feb. 17, 2013), http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2013/02/17/gop-governors-stand 
-ground-on-obamacare-health-exchanges.  On the many roles for states in implementing the Af-
fordable Care Act, see Abbe R. Gluck, Essay, Intrastatutory Federalism and Statutory Interpreta-
tion: State Implementation of Federal Law in Health Reform and Beyond, 121 YALE L.J. 534, 
576–94 (2011). 
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tions on state sovereignty, the resulting federalism is contingent.  But 
because there is significant party division across the states and within 
the federal government, the contingency is not a fragile one. 
To be sure, a different way to tell the Affordable Care Act story is a 
more standard federalism narrative: Republicans favor states’ rights 
while Democrats favor national power.  Especially because the states’ 
rights position is often a no-government-should-do-it rather than a 
state-government-should-do-it position, Republicans have more often 
been associated with arguments for state power than have Democrats.  
But federalism doesn’t have a consistent partisan bent.  On some is-
sues, and during certain periods, Republicans favor the states; other 
times, Democrats do.80 
Consider, then, the most prominent federalism fight to reach the 
Supreme Court in the Term after the health care case.  With respect to 
the federal Defense of Marriage Act81 (DOMA), Democratic states, and 
some federal Democratic officials, argued that the federal government 
had interfered with a sovereign state prerogative, while Republican 
state and federal officials defended national power.82  In some respects, 
particularly a temporal one, the fight over same-sex marriage is not a 
partisan story.  DOMA was enacted not long ago with bipartisan sup-
port, and same-sex marriage seems certain in the future to become a 
national right, supported by Democrats and Republicans alike.  The 
partisan valence of same-sex marriage in general and DOMA in par-
ticular is far from stable; indeed, now that the Supreme Court has in-
validated section 3 of DOMA, Democrats will likely focus on establish-
ing a national right to same-sex marriage as Republicans double down 
on states’ right not to recognize same-sex marriage. 
But in recent years, same-sex marriage has been a partisan issue, 
and state sovereignty has been attractive to Democrats as a vehicle for 
its recognition.  At both the state and the national level, Democratic 
officials denounced the federal government’s definition of marriage as 
an unwarranted intrusion on the states, while Republicans at both the 
state and the national level supported it as a valid exercise of national 
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 80 See, e.g., David J. Barron, Foreword: Blue State Federalism at the Crossroads, 3 HARV. L. 
& POL’Y REV. 1 (2009); Heather K. Gerken, A New Progressive Federalism, 24 DEMOCRACY 37 
(2012); Young, supra note 52; see also Gillian E. Metzger, Federalism Under Obama, 53 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 567, 610 (2011) (suggesting that progressives may have a lasting interest in  
federalism). 
 81 Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996) (codified at 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2012); 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1738C (2006)). 
 82 The Supreme Court struck down section 3 of DOMA, which defined marriage for purposes 
of federal law as being between one man and one woman.  United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 
2675 (2013).  Section 2, which concerns state recognition of same-sex marriages performed in other 
states, remains in effect.   
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power.83  After a federal court of appeals struck down section 3 of 
DOMA, fifteen states governed by Republicans sought certiorari, sup-
porting a “national” interest in “conferring exclusive benefits on tradi-
tional marriage.”84  Massachusetts, with its Democratic Governor, At-
torney General, and legislature, meanwhile, urged the Supreme Court 
to recognize “the substantial impairment of State sovereignty wrought 
by DOMA” and to hold section 3 of the Act unconstitutional as a vio-
lation of the Tenth Amendment and the Spending Clause.85 
While red states have been more likely than blue states to champi-
on state sovereignty against exercises of federal power, DOMA high-
lights that this alignment is not inevitable.  And, though a striking re-
cent example, same-sex marriage is not the only issue with respect to 
which Democratic states have made arguments for state sovereignty or 
Republican states have made arguments for national power.86  De-
pending on the particular question and the broader context, some 
states champion state autonomy while others welcome national action.  
State status as such does not tell us when states will make arguments 
sounding in sovereignty and oppose the federal government.  Party 
politics offers a better, if necessarily imperfect, guide.  And it becomes 
still more powerful as we move from the realm of litigation to the 
realm of legislation. 
2.  Legislation: Institutional Isomorphism. — States frequently 
challenge the federal government by using their own lawmaking ca-
pacity to enact policies disfavored by the majority at the national level.  
The institutional isomorphism of the state and federal governments — 
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 83 Some Republicans have also advocated more sweeping national prohibitions on same-sex 
marriage.  See, e.g., Shailagh Murray, Same-Sex Marriage Ban Is Defeated, WASH. POST, June 8, 
2006, at A1 (describing Republican support for a federal constitutional amendment banning same-
sex marriage). 
 84 Brief of the States of Indiana et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of the Petition at 3, 4, Bipar-
tisan Legal Advisory Grp. of the U.S. House of Representatives v. Gill, 133 S. Ct. 2884 (2013) 
(mem.) (No. 12-13) (capitalization omitted).  The brief represented fourteen states with Republi-
can governors and attorneys general and one state with a Democratic governor and a Republican 
attorney general.  
 85 Response of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts in Support of Certiorari at 16, Gill, 133 S. 
Ct. 2884, & Dept. of Health & Human Servs. v. Massachusetts, 133 S. Ct. 2887 (2013) (mem.) 
(Nos. 12-13 & 12-15); see also, e.g., id. at 20 (calling DOMA “a sweeping and unprecedented fed-
eral incursion into an area that, for centuries, has been a domain of exclusive State regulation”).  
A group of states governed predominantly by Democrats made similar sovereignty arguments af-
ter the Supreme Court granted certiorari in a related case.  See Brief on the Merits for New York 
et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent Edith Schlain Windsor at 2, Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 
2675 (No. 12-307) (“[T]he amici States object to Congress’s unprecedented act of rejecting the de-
cisions of sovereign States to authorize same-sex marriage.”). 
 86 For example, in McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010), a case concerning in-
corporation of the Second Amendment, only Democratic attorneys general made arguments about 
state sovereignty.  See Brief for the States of Illinois, Maryland, and New Jersey as Amici Curiae 
in Support of Respondents, McDonald, 130 S. Ct. 3020 (No. 08-1521); see also, e.g., Massachusetts 
v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007). 
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the fact that state governments have the same structure as the federal 
government, including legislative, executive, and judicial branches — 
is an oft-noted feature of our polity.87  Party politics calls attention to a 
possibility inherent in legislative isomorphism: states may adopt legis-
lation that has been rejected, or not taken up, on partisan lines at the 
federal level.  Often working together directly or through allied interest 
groups like the American Legislative Exchange Council, state and fed-
eral politicians shuffle ideas and even bill text back and forth, seeking 
friendly partisan ground in which to plant their policies.  The resulting 
policies are only “state” or “national” in the sense of their site of en-
actment, not their purposes or intended audiences. 
When President George W. Bush took office in 2001, for example, 
the states began to enact legislation furthering the Democratic agen-
da.88  In many instances, states adopted policies that Democrats in 
Congress had pushed for without success and that these national rep-
resentatives then helped to defend from federal preemption.  Most no-
tably, while the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) took no ac-
tion on climate change and Democrats in Congress were unable to 
enact legislation regulating greenhouse gas emissions,89 Democratic 
legislators in California, Hawaii, and New Jersey passed laws to re-
duce greenhouse gas emissions, succeeding where their national coun-
terparts failed.90  California’s efforts were the most significant because 
of its leadership role under the Clean Air Act.91  The state enacted 
laws authorizing a cap-and-trade program and imposing emissions 
standards on motor vehicles.92  Sixteen other states, most with Demo-
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 87 E.g., FEELEY & RUBIN, supra note 5, at 13–14. 
 88 See Barron, supra note 80, at 1–2; Robert A. Schapiro, Not Old or Borrowed: The Truly New 
Blue Federalism, 3 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 33, 41–45 (2009).  In addition to passing new laws, 
Democratic state actors also interpreted existing state laws more aggressively than the federal 
administration read complementary federal laws.  See, e.g., Margaret H. Lemos, State Enforce-
ment of Federal Law, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 698, 725–26 (2011). 
 89 See, e.g., JONATHAN L. RAMSEUR & BRENT D. YACOBUCCI, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 
RL34067, CLIMATE CHANGE LEGISLATION IN THE 110TH CONGRESS (2007); BRENT D. 
YACOBUCCI, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32955, CLIMATE CHANGE LEGISLATION IN THE 
109TH CONGRESS (2005); Jennifer 8. Lee, The Warming Is Global but the Legislating, in the U.S., 
Is All Local, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 29, 2003, at A20; Bucking Court, EPA Won’t Control Climate Gas-
es, NBC NEWS (July 11, 2008, 2:12 PM), http://www.nbcnews.com/id/25641109/ns/us_news 
-environment/t/bucking-court-epa-wont-control-climate-gases. 
 90 See JONATHAN L. RAMSEUR, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33812, CLIMATE CHANGE: 
ACTION BY STATES TO ADDRESS GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS 8 (2008).  
 91 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7671q (2006 & Supp. V 2011); see id. § 7543(b) (2006) (granting Califor-
nia, as the only state to have adopted its own standards prior to March 30, 1966, a possible waiver 
from federal preemption of vehicle emissions standards); id. § 7507 (permitting other states to 
adopt California’s standards in lieu of federal standards). 
 92 Califonia Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006, 2006 Cal. Stat. 3419 (codified in scattered 
sections of the CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 43018.5 
(Deering 2012).  
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cratic legislatures, announced that they would adopt these standards.93  
California required a Clean Air Act preemption waiver for its emis-
sions standards,94 however, and the EPA denied the waiver.95  Demo-
cratic members of Congress accordingly turned their attention from 
pushing federal solutions to supporting state efforts.  The House Over-
sight Committee, for instance, spent five months investigating the 
EPA’s waiver denial.96 
The question of state versus federal regulation thus played out as a 
partisan issue.  Democrats in the federal and state legislatures alike 
championed state authority and cast state legislatures as an extension 
of the national legislature.  California took up approaches that had 
been broached, without success, in Congress.  And both state and fed-
eral actors saw California’s actions as the best route to generating na-
tionwide action on climate change because, in the short term, collective 
adoption by other states of California’s standards could effectively cre-
ate national policy and, over time, California’s law could “lead[] the 
way” to new federal legislative and administrative action.97 
A similar partisan divide erupted around the same time with re-
spect to embryonic stem cell research.  In 2001, President Bush issued 
an executive directive preventing federal agencies from using federal 
funds for research on new embryonic stem cell lines.98  With over-
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 93 See RAMSEUR, supra note 90, at 12 n.59 (listing the states adopting the standards as Arizo-
na, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New Mexico, 
New York, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Utah, Vermont, and Washington).  Twelve of the 
states had Democratic legislatures, and one had a divided legislature.  See 2008 Post-Election 
Partisan Composition of State Legislatures, KSE PARTNERS LLP (Nov. 5, 2008), http://www 
.ksefocus.com/pdf/2008Post-ElectionChart.pdf. 
 94 See 42 U.S.C. § 7543(b). 
 95 Notice of Decision Denying a Waiver of Clean Air Act Preemption for California’s 2009 and 
Subsequent Model Year Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards for New Motor Vehicles, 73 Fed. 
Reg. 12,156 (Mar. 6, 2008). 
 96 See Memorandum from the House Comm. on Oversight and Gov’t Reform, Majority Staff, 
to Members of the House Comm. on Oversight and Gov’t Reform, EPA’s Denial of the California 
Waiver (May 19, 2008), available at http://oversight-archive.waxman.house.gov/documents 
/20080519131253.pdf.  The waiver was only granted when President Barack Obama assumed of-
fice.  Notice of Decision Granting a Waiver of Clean Air Act Preemption for California’s 2009 and 
Subsequent Model Year Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards for New Motor Vehicles, 74 Fed. 
Reg. 32,744 (July 8, 2009).  
 97 Press Release, Representative Peter Welch, Welch Leads Congressional Effort on  
Auto Standards, Citing Guidance of Vermont Court Case (Sept. 20, 2007) (quoting Rep. Peter 
Welch) (internal quotation mark omitted), available at http://www.cleancarscampaign.org/web 
-content/cleanairact/docs/welch-waiver-9-20-07.pdf. 
 98 See Press Release, The White House, Fact Sheet: Embryonic Stem Cell Research (Aug.  
9, 2001), available at http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/08/20010809 
-1.html.   
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whelmingly Democratic support,99 Congress passed a bill that would 
permit federal funds to be used in research on new stem cell lines,100 
but the President vetoed the legislation.101  As with climate change, the 
states thus became the focus of Democratic policymaking for both 
state and federal actors.  In response to the federal restrictions, eight 
states enacted laws between 2004 and 2008 to encourage and fund em-
bryonic stem cell research.102  California again played a leading role, 
passing a ballot initiative in 2004 that authorized $3 billion for embry-
onic stem cell research.103  While California’s use of a ballot initiative 
might seem to bring its actions outside of party politics — direct de-
mocracy was, after all, designed to avoid the corrupting party influ-
ence104 — it actually underscores the opposite point: the increasing in-
volvement of the parties in initiative contests.105  A main architect of 
the proposition was a Democratic state senator who had sponsored 
prior stem cell legislation, while California’s Republican Party gener-
ated the primary opposition to the measure.106  State lawmaking re-
mained the leading tool for Democratic policy on embryonic stem cells 
until President Barack Obama assumed office and brought national 
policy in line with these state actions.107 
During the Obama Administration, the tables have turned, and 
now it is the Republican Party seizing on the power of state legisla-
tures to advance its national agenda.  Across the country, Republican 
state legislatures have adopted strict voter ID laws after congressional 
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 99 See U.S. Senate Roll Call Votes 109th Congress — 2nd Session, U.S. SENATE: LEGISLA-
TION & RECORDS, http://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll_call_lists/roll_call_vote_cfm.cfm 
?congress=109&session=2&vote=00206 (last visited Nov. 24, 2013) (describing vote for H.R. 810). 
 100 See Stem Cell Research Enhancement Act of 2005, H.R. 810, 109th Cong. (2006).  
 101 Bill Summary & Status — 109th Congress (2005–2006) — H.R.810, THOMAS, http:// 
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 103 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 125291.10, .30 (Deering 2012). 
 104 See, e.g., THOMAS E. CRONIN, DIRECT DEMOCRACY 46–48 (1989) (quoting Nathan Cree 
as stating in 1892 that direct democracy was intended to “break the crushing and stifling power of 
our great party machines . . . [and] to relieve us from the dominance of partisan passions” (quoting 
NATHAN CREE, DIRECT LEGISLATION BY THE PEOPLE 16 (1892))). 
 105 See Dan Smith, The Initiative to Party: The Role of Political Parties in State Ballot Initia-
tives, in INITIATIVE-CENTERED POLITICS 97 (David McCuan & Stephen Stambough eds., 
2005) (arguing that parties are increasingly involved in ballot measures because they may increase 
voter turnout, serve as wedge issues, or promote party platforms); id. at 105–06 (discussing Cali-
fornia initiatives). 
 106 See Joel W. Adelson & Joanna K. Weinberg, The California Stem Cell Initiative: Persua-
sion, Politics, and Public Science, 100 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 446, 447–48 (2010). 
 107 See Exec. Order No. 13,505, 3 C.F.R. 229 (2010) (revoking President Bush’s directive).  
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Republicans have been unable to enact similar laws.108  So too, Repub-
lican state legislatures have responded to failed congressional attempts 
to repeal the Affordable Care Act by passing numerous laws seeking to 
limit implementation of the Act109 — efforts that Republican members 
of Congress have goaded.110 
As the stem cell debate during the Bush years anticipated, abortion 
remains one of the sharpest sites of partisan federal conflict.  In 2011, 
for instance, Republicans in the House voted to cut off federal funding 
for Planned Parenthood because the organization provides abortion 
services.111  After the Democratic Senate rejected the rider, state legis-
latures took up the cause.  In 2011 and 2012, six states with Republi-
can legislatures passed laws cutting Planned Parenthood’s funding,112 
and two states took similar executive action on party lines.113  While 
Republican state legislators have relied on their autonomous lawmak-
ing powers to defund Planned Parenthood, their actions are continuous 
with federal efforts.  As the leader of Americans United for Life noted, 
the House’s vote to defund Planned Parenthood “both reflected similar 
actions in the states and encouraged similar state actions.”114 
Whether the states are taking up the Republican or Democratic 
policy agenda, their laws have a variety of different aims vis-à-vis the 
federal government.  Sometimes they seek to push the federal govern-
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 108 See Voter Identification Requirements, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl 
.org/legislatures-elections/elections/voter-id.aspx#Legislation (last visited Nov. 24, 2013). 
 109 State Legislation and Actions Challenging Certain Health Reforms, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEG-
ISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/health/state-laws-and-actions-challenging-ppaca 
.aspx#2011_bills (last updated Oct. 2013).  
 110 E.g., Letter from Senator Jim DeMint et al. to the Nat’l Governors Ass’n (June 29,  
2012), available at http://bachmann.house.gov/sites/bachmann.house.gov/files/UploadedFiles 
/congresslettertonga_070212.pdf (urging governors to resist setting up health insurance exchanges 
in their states to “assist . . . Congress to repeal this violation” (emphasis omitted)).  The conserva-
tive American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC) has drafted model legislation for the states.  
See, e.g., Press Release, Am. Legislative Exch. Council, State Legislators Last Line of Defense 
Against ObamaCare (Mar. 22, 2010), available at http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/state 
-legislators-last-line-of-defense-against-obamacare-88817322.html. 
 111 Final Vote Results for Roll Call 93, OFFICE OF THE CLERK, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRE-
SENTATIVES (Feb. 18, 2011, 2:13 PM), http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2011/roll093.xml.  House Repub-
licans voted in favor 230 to 7, while Democrats voted against 178 to 10.  Id. 
 112 AMS. UNITED FOR LIFE, DEFENDING LIFE 2012, at 37–39 (2012) (discussing laws in In-
diana, Kansas, Montana, North Carolina, Texas, and Wisconsin). 
 113 Republican Governor Chris Christie of New Jersey vetoed funding for Planned Parenthood 
approved by the state’s Democratic legislature, id. at 38–39, while New Hampshire’s Republican-
controlled Executive Council rejected Planned Parenthood’s state contract, Jason McLure,  
New Hampshire Planned Parenthood Stops Providing Birth Control, REUTERS, July 8, 2011, 
available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/07/08/us-planned-parenthood-new-hampshire 
-idUSTRE7675Z820110708. 
 114 For the Record: Charmaine Yoest: April 2012, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES, http:// 
www.ncsl.org/issues-research/health/for-the-record-charmaine-yoest-april-2012.aspx (last visited 
Nov. 24, 2013). 
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ment into action.  Sometimes they keep issues in the national spotlight 
that would have faded from public view when the minority party in 
Congress could not enact legislation or even get it onto the floor, or 
when the majority party had insufficient numbers to defeat a filibuster 
or presidential veto.  Sometimes they motivate other states to take sim-
ilar actions, creating a sort of national law without Congress.115  What 
unites these laws is that, while they rely on state autonomy in one 
sense — the state’s ability to enact its own legislation — this is not au-
tonomy as separation.  States are using their lawmaking abilities to 
take stands on national issues, working in direct cooperation with na-
tional figures who are not able to achieve their ends in Washington, or 
more diffusely following contours of party agendas.  Institutional iso-
morphism becomes a vehicle not for dual federalism but for state-
federal interaction and contestation. 
3.  Administration: Uncooperative Federalism. — States also op-
pose federal policy from within federal schemes, pushing back against 
federal policy using the authority conferred on them to carry out fed-
eral law.  Party politics plays a critical role in motivating such uncoop-
erative federalism.116 
Sometimes states act uncooperatively by refusing to take part in 
programs that the federal government has designed intending state 
participation.  Partisanship can trump even strong fiscal interests.  
During the Bush Administration, Democratic states widely refused 
funding for sex-education programs that required abstinence-only in-
struction.117  More recently, many Republican states have declined 
grants to expand Medicaid or to set up their own health insurance ex-
changes pursuant to the Affordable Care Act.118 
In other instances, partisanship leads states to tweak or generate 
internal opposition to federal programs they administer.  During Bill 
Clinton’s Presidency, for example, Republican state governors includ-
ing Tommy Thompson and John Engler used their role in administer-
ing federal welfare programs to push back against policies they re-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 115 See infra section III.A, pp. 1123–30. 
 116 On uncooperative federalism, see generally Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, supra note 51.  On 
uncooperative federalism with respect to national executive power in particular, see generally 
Bulman-Pozen, Federalism as a Safeguard, supra note 56. 
 117 Alesha E. Doan & Deborah R. McFarlane, Saying No to Abstinence-Only Education: An 
Analysis of State Decision-Making, 42 PUBLIUS 613 (2012) (finding that partisanship and ideolo-
gy drove states’ rejection of abstinence-only funds). 
 118 See GOP Governors Reject ObamaCare Health Exchange Partnerships, supra note 79.  See 
generally Brian Galle, Federal Grants, State Decisions, 88 B.U. L. REV. 875 (2008) (exploring why 
state officials decline federal grants); Sean Nicholson-Crotty, Leaving Money on the Table: Learn-
ing from Recent Refusals of Federal Grants in the American States, 42 PUBLIUS 449, 462 (2012) 
(“Between 2009 and 2011, over 40 percent of Republican governors publicly rejected or refused to 
apply for funds being offered by the Obama administration.”). 
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garded as cultivating dependency rather than work and marriage.119  
These governors also leveraged their administrative know-how — and 
their leadership of the Republican Governors Association — to work 
with Republicans in Congress to devolve still more power to the 
states.120  Their push to convert welfare into a block-grant program 
was at once a push to devolve power to the states and a push to move 
the substantive commitments of welfare policy in a Republican  
direction.121 
A decade later, the national debate about eligibility requirements 
for the State Children’s Health Insurance Program (SCHIP) also had a 
partisan-inflected federalism dimension.  Taking advantage of the op-
portunity the statute had provided for states to create their own insur-
ance schemes, Democratic state legislatures had significantly expanded 
coverage — for instance, to certain adults and to children of families 
with incomes at three times the poverty level.122  When SCHIP came 
up for reauthorization in 2007, President Bush and congressional Re-
publicans sought to impose federal restrictions on such state experi-
mentation, while congressional Democrats argued vigorously for state 
flexibility.123  As with welfare policy, a partisan debate about the sub-
stance of SCHIP played out in significant part as a question of nation-
al versus state control, although the partisan lines had switched.  In 
both instances, state actors seized on their administrative role to re-
shape federal policy, and they enjoyed the backing of partisan allies in 
Congress.  In both instances, partisanship was the motivating force, 
but federalism was a critical currency. 
With respect to immigration, state and federal actors have similarly 
advanced different views, and different rhetoric, about state versus 
federal power depending on which party holds the presidency.  During 
the Bush Administration, several blue states resisted aggressive en-
forcement of federal immigration law.  Some prevented their law en-
forcement officers from carrying out federal immigration laws concern-
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 119 See, e.g., MICHAEL B. KATZ, THE PRICE OF CITIZENSHIP 83–103 (2001); LEARNING 
FROM LEADERS (Carol S. Weissert ed., 2000); Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, supra note 51, at  
1274–76.  
 120 See JOHN D. NUGENT, SAFEGUARDING FEDERALISM 146–47 (2009). 
 121 See Patty Edmonds, States Turn Values Rhetoric into Legislative Action, USA TODAY, Aug. 
8, 1996, at A7 (“The states ‘have become very much activists in trying to reform social programs, 
to . . . set a moral tone for our society,’ says Wisconsin Gov. Tommy Thompson, a Republican.” 
(alteration in original)).  While President Clinton ultimately signed the Republican House–
generated Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act, he resisted other state attempts to 
further devolve welfare policy in the service of Republican ends.  See Garry Wills, The War Be-
tween the States . . . and Washington, N.Y. TIMES, July 5, 1998, § 6 (Magazine), at 26. 
 122 See Colleen M. Grogan & Elizabeth Rigby, Federalism, Partisan Politics, and Shifting Sup-
port for State Flexibility: The Case of the U.S. State Children’s Health Insurance Program, 39 
PUBLIUS 47, 59, 61 (2009). 
 123 Id. at 60–62. 
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ing unlawful presence,124 while certain Democratic state officials, in-
cluding the Massachusetts and New York attorneys general, staged 
confrontations with federal agencies around the rights of undocument-
ed workers.125 
During the Obama Administration, Republican-controlled states 
have deployed their role as administrators of federal immigration law 
to call for more aggressive enforcement.126  Arizona’s controversial S.B. 
1070, for example, marshals state law in an effort to increase  
immigration-related arrests and deportations.  While the Supreme 
Court held several provisions of the law preempted before they took ef-
fect,127 the litigation was notable both for bolstering uncooperative fed-
eralism as a means of resistance and for drawing partisan lines that cut 
across the state-federal divide.  First, the single challenged section of 
the law that the Supreme Court upheld rested on a U.S. Code provision 
giving states a role in carrying out federal law.128  While the federal 
provision assumes federal-state “cooperation,” however, Arizona’s reli-
ance on the provision is decidedly uncooperative with respect to the 
Obama Administration: the state is using the power given to it within 
a federal scheme to oppose the federal executive’s policy choices about 
how that scheme is carried out.129  Second, partisanship again trumped 
politicians’ state or federal office in shaping their positions on the law.  
Republican state attorneys general argued in support of the state law, 
while Democratic state attorneys general insisted that federal law 
preempted Arizona’s scheme.130  Meanwhile, congressional Democrats 
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 124 See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 181.850 (2011); S.J. Res. 19, 59th Leg., Reg. Sess., 2005 Mont. 
Laws 3042; N.M. Exec. Order. No. 2005-019 (2005), rescinded by N.M. Exec. Order No. 2011- 
009 (2011).  
 125 Peter H. Schuck, Taking Immigration Federalism Seriously, 2007 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 57, 63–
64.  See generally Cristina M. Rodríguez, The Significance of the Local in Immigration Regula-
tion, 106 MICH. L. REV. 567 (2008). 
 126 See generally Pratheepan Gulasekaram & S. Karthick Ramakrishnan, Immigration Federal-
ism: A Reappraisal, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2074 (2013) (providing a partisanship-based account of the 
recent rise of subnational immigration policies).  State rhetoric, at least, has insisted that the 
Obama Administration has been lax in deporting individuals, though in fact it has deported more 
people per year than any prior administration.  See, e.g., Has Barack Obama Deported More Peo-
ple than Any Other President in U.S. History?, POLITIFACT, http://www.politifact.com/truth-o 
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-people-any-other-pr (last visited Nov. 24, 2013). 
 127 See Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2510 (2012). 
 128 Id. at 2507–10. 
 129 See Bulman-Pozen, Federalism as a Safeguard, supra note 56, at 484–86. 
 130 See Brief of Amici Curiae State of Michigan and Fifteen Other States in Support of the Pe-
titioners, Arizona, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (No. 11-182) (representing thirteen states with Republican at-
torneys general and two states, West Virginia and Wyoming, with Democratic attorneys general); 
Brief for State of New York et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent, Arizona, 132 S. Ct. 
2492 (No. 11-182) (representing eleven states with Democratic attorneys general).  Five states with 
Republican governors and legislatures — Alabama, Georgia, Indiana, South Carolina, and 
Utah — also adopted copycat laws modeled on Arizona’s.  See State Anti-Immigrant Laws, 
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argued that the law was preempted, while congressional Republicans 
sided with Arizona.131  In contrast to the immigration federalism de-
bate of the early 2000s, the immigration federalism debate of the 2010s 
aligned Republicans with state power and Democrats with national 
authority.132 
* * * 
Many state challenges of the type discussed in this section are effec-
tive, but a significant number fail in important ways.  The Supreme 
Court, for example, largely rejected state arguments against the Af-
fordable Care Act and deemed most of Arizona’s immigration law 
preempted, while lower courts have invalidated several laws seeking to 
defund Planned Parenthood.  For those focused solely on the short-
term effects on the federal government, such challenges may be of little 
utility.  But, as the next Part argues, even these challenges are im-
portant to federalism’s vitality because they help maintain individuals’ 
commitment to states as sites of opposition — a commitment that ul-
timately gives the states power to launch successful as well as failed 
challenges and that connects individuals to the polity even when they 
are alienated from the federal government. 
II.  PARTISAN IDENTIFICATION WITH STATES 
Federalism critically depends not only on the relationship between 
the state and federal governments, but also on the relationship of the 
people to the states and the nation.  For federalism to work, much doc-
trine and scholarship insists, the people must politically identify with 
the states as well as the nation.  Yet contemporary federalism scholars 
are skeptical that most Americans have state-based identities.  Coun-
tering arguments that the fifty states are discrete civil societies, these 
scholars have suggested our political identity is national only. 
This Part does not attempt to defend a notion of state identity as 
such but instead argues that we may be missing a powerful form of 
identification with states because our understanding of what consti-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/immigrants-rights/state-anti-immigrant-laws (last visited Nov. 24, 
2013). 
 131 Compare Amici Curiae Brief of Members of Congress and the Committee to Protect Ameri-
ca’s Border in Support of Petitioners, Arizona, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (No. 11-182), with Amici Curiae 
Brief of Members of Congress in Support of Respondent, Arizona, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (No. 11-182).  
 132 This partisan mapping followed not only from state action but also from the federal re-
sponse to state action.  While states have enacted both pro- and anti-immigrant laws during both 
Democratic and Republican administrations, see infra section III.A, pp. 1123–30 (discussing state 
diversity), the Bush Administration visibly attacked sanctuary jurisdictions, not anti-immigrant 
laws, while the Obama Administration has visibly attacked anti-immigrant laws, not sanctuary 
jurisdictions. 
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tutes political identity is too rigid.  Americans need not regard states as 
distinctive civil societies or consistently prize their membership in the 
state polity for states to be meaningful sites of identification.  When we 
expand our inquiry to encompass more fluid and contingent forms of 
state identity, partisanship emerges as a key variable, a reason for in-
dividuals to channel loyalty and affiliation toward states rather than 
toward the nation alone.  After section II.A describes debates about 
state identity, section II.B argues that partisanship is a powerful socio-
political identification, and section II.C illustrates how states serve as 
sites of partisan identification.  Ultimately, a focus on partisanship 
suggests that state-based identification may be shifting and partial — 
and, perhaps paradoxically, a means of expressing national identity — 
but nonetheless a significant buttress of American federalism. 
A.  Problems of Identity and Loyalty in American Federalism 
An animating premise of much federalism doctrine and scholarship 
is that states must command political loyalty and identity.133  For 
many federations, state-based affiliations are understood as prior to 
and necessitating federalism in the first instance.  The point of federal-
ism, on this view, is to accommodate diversity, to allow individuals 
who are different from each other in some important respect to live to-
gether and yet apart.134  In other instances, commentators consider 
state-based loyalty a means to distinct ends that federalism aspires to 
guarantee.  Federalism is said to preserve liberty, for example, by plac-
ing two governments in competition, but these two governments have 
power to compete only insofar as individuals identify with both; indi-
viduals’ attachments to their states, in particular, hold centripetal forc-
es in check.135  Such accounts are often agnostic about the sources of 
state-based identity, recognizing that state borders may create, rather 
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 133 See, e.g., FEELEY & RUBIN, supra note 5; RIKER, supra note 8, at 136 (“[F]ederalism is 
maintained by the existence of dual citizen loyalties to the two levels of government.”); Sujit 
Choudhry, Citizenship and Federations: Some Preliminary Reflections, in THE FEDERAL VI-
SION 377, 387 (Kalypso Nicolaidis & Robert Howse eds., 2001) (“It is often asserted that the exis-
tence of divided or multiple allegiances is one of the defining features of federalism . . . .”); John 
O. McGinnis, Reviving Tocqueville’s America: The Rehnquist Court’s Jurisprudence of Social Dis-
covery, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 485, 525–26 (2002) (arguing that successful federalism requires “citi-
zens’ emotional attachments to their states,” id. at 526). 
 134 See, e.g., Will Kymlicka, Federalism, Nationalism, and Multiculturalism, in THEORIES OF 
FEDERALISM 269 (Dimitrios Karmis & Wayne Norman eds., 2005). 
 135 The classic account is Madison’s in The Federalist No. 45 and The Federalist No. 46.  For a 
contemporary account, see Jacob T. Levy, Federalism, Liberalism, and the Separation of Loyalties, 
101 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 459 (2007).  Cf. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 459 (1991) (arguing 
that the federal and state governments will act as mutual restraints “only if both are credible”). 
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than simply reflect, political identities.136  But they, too, posit states as 
necessary sites of identification. 
What, then, generates state-based loyalties and identities in the 
United States?  The answer suggested for many polities — ethnically, 
linguistically, or religiously identified communities — cannot be giv-
en.137  In its place, some of the staunchest defenders of American fed-
eralism cast the states themselves as diverse cultural communities.  On 
Daniel Elazar’s influential account, for instance, each state is a “dis-
tinct societ[y]”138 associated with a particular character and set of fun-
damental values.139  Thus, for Elazar and his many successors, state 
borders may not map neatly onto race, language, religion, or the like, 
but states themselves reflect different American ethnocultural identi-
ties.140  Instead of the Flemish and Walloons, we have Floridians and 
Washingtonians. 
But accounts that treat state identities as distinctive, deep-seated, 
and fixed face a host of complications.  Although the United States is 
not a homogenous polity, American heterogeneity does not closely 
track state borders.  Today, individuals from Montana to Mississippi to 
Maine can eat at the same restaurant chains, shop at the same stores, 
read the same publications, and listen to the same music.141  And these 
individuals in Montana, Mississippi, and Maine might be just one per-
son: half of Americans age twenty-five and older do not live in their 
state of birth, and more than a quarter of American adults have lived 
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 136 See, e.g., Richard Briffault, “What About the ‘Ism’?” Normative and Formal Concerns in 
Contemporary Federalism, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1303, 1306 (1994); Levy, supra note 135, at 475.  One 
recalls Samuel Beer’s quip: “Look at the map.  It must make you wonder whether there could 
have been a United States, if the rectangle had not been invented.”  Samuel H. Beer, Federalism, 
Nationalism, and Democracy in America, 72 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 9, 16 (1978). 
 137 By invoking these possibilities, I do not mean to endorse the idea that identity and loyalty 
necessarily follow from territorial divisions mapped onto ethnocultural cleavages, nor to suggest 
this is desirable.  See, e.g., DONALD L. HOROWITZ, ETHNIC GROUPS IN CONFLICT 617–19 
(1985) (noting benefits of ethnically heterogeneous federal units in certain circumstances). 
 138 Daniel J. Elazar, Foreword: The Moral Compass of State Constitutionalism, 30 RUTGERS 
L.J. 849, 861 (1999). 
 139 ELAZAR, supra note 5, at 14–25, 109–12. 
 140 For simplicity’s sake, I am here counting as Elazar’s successors a broad array of scholars 
ranging from Richard Briffault — who focuses on states’ fixed boundaries, territorial integrity, 
and lawmaking capacity rather than inherent differences among their populations as underlying 
their status as “relatively distinctive ‘civil societies’” — to Joel Lieske — who has drilled down 
further on Elazar’s conception of state cultures.  Briffault, supra note 136, at 1306 (quoting 
ELAZAR, supra note 5, at 14–25); Joel Lieske, American State Cultures: Testing a New Measure 
and Theory, 42 PUBLIUS 108 (2012); see also, e.g., Lynn A. Baker & Ernest A. Young, Federalism 
and the Double Standard of Judicial Review, 51 DUKE L.J. 75, 150 n.335 (2001) (inviting skeptics 
of state identity to come live in Texas for six months); Peter J. Spiro, The Citizenship Dilemma, 51 
STAN. L. REV. 597, 621 n.120 (1999) (book review) (arguing that distinctive state-based identities 
are on the rise). 
 141 See, e.g., JAMES A. GARDNER, INTERPRETING STATE CONSTITUTIONS 69–72 (2005); 
SCHAPIRO, supra note 12, at 25–26. 
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in three or more states.142  To the extent the states reflect cultural dif-
ferences, regional rather than state distinctiveness is likely to be what 
matters.  And urban/rural cleavages may generate both intrastate divi-
sion and interstate unity.  Moreover, many of our major metropolitan 
areas cross state lines.  Are residents of Gary or Hammond culturally 
identified with Indiana over Chicago?143  Even those commentators 
who have attempted to trace distinct American cultures within the 
United States have thus tended to find state borders both over- and 
under-inclusive.144  Indeed, Elazar’s own moralistic-individualistic-
traditionalistic typology reveals significant intrastate differentiation 
and interstate commonality.145 
In light of these and other complications, most recent federalism 
scholarship has rejected the notion of state identity altogether, at least 
for the majority of states.146  In particularly strong terms, Malcolm 
Feeley and Edward Rubin insist that because Americans do not identi-
fy with states, the United States cannot be said to have a federal sys-
tem.147  In their view, federalism responds to divided political loyalties, 
but “the American people . . . have a unified political identity.  Not on-
ly do they identify themselves primarily as Americans, but they insist 
on normative uniformity throughout the nation.”148  Jacob Levy simi-
larly argues that “American federalism today may not be very effec-
tive” because “[c]leavages that cut across states are the rule.”149  With-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 142 See PING REN, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, LIFETIME MOBILITY IN THE UNITED STATES: 
2010, at 4 tbl.2 (2011); PEW RESEARCH CTR., AMERICAN MOBILITY: WHO MOVES? WHO 
STAYS PUT? WHERE’S HOME? 13 (2008), available at http://pewsocialtrends.org/files/2010/10 
/Movers-and-Stayers.pdf.  A substantial percentage of Americans who move consider “home” a 
place other than where they currently live.  PEW RESEARCH CTR., supra, at 25 (finding that, of 
U.S.-born adults who have lived in more than one community, thirty-eight percent say they con-
sider home some place other than where they live now).  For some thoughts on cross-state affilia-
tion, see infra section III.B, pp. 1130–35. 
 143 Cf. Jerry Frug, Decentering Decentralization, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 253, 320–30 (1993) (explor-
ing individuals’ attachments to places other than their residences). 
 144 See, e.g., JAMES G. GIMPEL & JASON E. SCHUKNECHT, PATCHWORK NATION (2003); 
COLIN WOODARD, AMERICAN NATIONS (2011). 
 145 See, e.g., ELAZAR, supra note 5, at 124–25.   
 146 Some scholars carve out states like Utah and Hawaii whose majorities can be identified by 
a particular characteristic, such as ethnicity or religion, and Texas is often placed in a category of 
its own.  See, e.g., Levy, supra note 135, at 468. 
 147 See FEELEY & RUBIN, supra note 5; Edward L. Rubin & Malcolm Feeley, Federalism: 
Some Notes on a National Neurosis, 41 UCLA L. REV. 903 (1994). 
 148 FEELEY & RUBIN, supra note 5, at 115. 
 149 Levy, supra note 135, at 468; see also Mark C. Gordon, Differing Paradigms, Similar Flaws: 
Constructing a New Approach to Federalism in Congress and the Court, 14 YALE L. & POL’Y 
REV. (SYMP. ISSUE) 187, 217 (1996) (arguing that the value of states today “lies not in their role 
as a focus of citizen loyalty and identification, but rather in the fact that they do not play that 
role”); Jacob T. Levy, Federalism and the New and Old Liberalisms, SOC. PHIL. & POL’Y, Jan. 
2007, at 306, 316 (“[L]oyalty to states . . . has dwindled to almost nothing in most parts of the 
United States.”). 
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out dismissing American federalism, other accounts similarly reject  
the idea of state identification.  Robert Schapiro argues that our polity 
is a thoroughly national one and scholars should focus on how federal-
ism works without succumbing to “an outdated focus on local varia-
tion” and “nostalgia for lost community.”150  Heather Gerken finds it 
“odd” that we bother even to discuss whether Americans identify with 
the states.151 
In their persuasive debunking of essentialist conceptions, however, 
these scholars risk throwing the baby out with the bathwater.  They 
undervalue how individuals may identify with states even if state 
boundaries do not demarcate distinct ethnocultural communities.  It is 
possible, that is, to posit meaningful state identification without em-
bracing what James Gardner calls “romantic subnationalism.”152  A 
handful of scholars have indeed invoked thinner conceptions of state 
identity.  Most notably, Vicki Jackson argues that American federalism 
promotes national accord because state-based civic identities crosscut 
deeper-seated racial, ethnic, or religious identities.153  But what gener-
ates state civic identities?154 
As the remainder of this Part explains, in the United States today, 
partisanship motivates individuals to identify with and feel loyal to the 
states as well as the nation in complicated and shifting but nonetheless 
significant ways.  Seeking to locate state identification in ways in 
which the states are different from the nation may obscure how simi-
larity undergirds identification.  Individuals may identify with the 
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 150 SCHAPIRO, supra note 12, at 7; see id. at 16–30, 82–85; see also, e.g., James A. Gardner, The 
Failed Discourse of State Constitutionalism, 90 MICH. L. REV. 761, 830 (1992) (noting “the gen-
eral absence of public identification with the polity defined by the state”). 
 151 Gerken, supra note 4, at 16–17. 
 152 GARDNER, supra note 141, at 53 (capitalization omitted). 
 153 Jackson, supra note 71, at 2221–22, 2221 n.189.  While Jackson emphasizes identities that 
Americans do not associate with states, the crosscutting allegiances she champions follow from 
individuals’ state-oriented “civic identities” that do not align with their more deeply felt identities.  
Id. at 2221; see also Calabresi, supra note 18, at 769 (“[N]ationwide crosscutting cleavages make 
American federalism stable because they give it a Madisonian plurality of interest groups, no one 
of which is likely to terrorize the others on a permanent basis.”); Daniel B. Rodriguez, State Con-
stitutional Failure, 2011 U. ILL. L. REV. 1243 (arguing that state constitutions can further state-
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 154 Some have read Jackson as agreeing with Elazar that the states are “integral communities of 
value.”  SCHAPIRO, supra note 12, at 88.  Yet Jackson represents as similar to her account Mark 
Gordon’s claim that American stability follows from the absence of state identification.  I think it 
most likely, then, that she has a thin conception of civic identity in mind.  See, e.g., Jackson, supra 
note 71, at 2222 (describing states as “useful loci toward which to direct political activism and 
organizing”).  My account may therefore be complementary to hers insofar as partisanship is a 
mechanism that translates political activism into identification.  Cf. Ernest A. Young, What Does 
It Take to Make a Federal System? On Constitutional Entrenchment, Separate Spheres, and Iden-
tity, 45 TULSA L. REV. 831, 843 (2011) (book review) (suggesting that state identity might be re-
vived by focusing on “critical political commitments” rather than distinctive cultural, ethnic, or 
religious patterns). 
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states not because they represent something essentially different from 
the nation, but rather because they articulate competing visions of the 
national will.155  Partisan identification with states thus underscores 
the nationalism of American federalism — yet this is a nationalism in 
which the states are not beside the point, as commentators like Feeley 
and Rubin suggest, but are instead key players in national politics and 
individuals’ understanding of themselves as Americans. 
B.  Partisanship as Identity 
As an ever-growing body of social science work demonstrates, par-
tisanship is a powerful political and social identification.156  Most 
American adults understand themselves as Democrats or Republicans, 
and even most self-proclaimed Independents process information and 
take positions on issues in ways indistinguishable from their partisan-
identified peers.157  Party identification is quite stable over time,158 and 
it is much more than a series of discrete actions, such as votes for par-
ticular candidates.  It colors how we process information and what we 
believe about particular issues and fundamental questions alike.159  It 
is, moreover, a social, as well as political, identification.  As Donald 
Green and his colleagues write, “[i]dentification with a political party 
is analogous to identification with religious, class, or ethnic groups.”160  
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 155 As Paul Kahn’s work on state constitutionalism has suggested in a related field, states rep-
resent multiple efforts to realize a common ideal of American governance.  Paul W. Kahn, Com-
mentary, Interpretation and Authority in State Constitutionalism, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1147, 1166 
(1993); cf. GARDNER, supra note 141, at 122 (positing an interdependence of state and national 
constitutionalism and suggesting that state power exists not only to ensure state self-government 
but also “for the benefit of the people of the nation”). 
 156 See, e.g., GREEN ET AL., supra note 6; ROSENBLUM, supra note 6; Carsey & Layman, su-
pra note 35. 
 157 Many Americans who call themselves Independents are “leaners,” see BRUCE E. KEITH ET 
AL., THE MYTH OF THE INDEPENDENT VOTER 13 (1992) (internal quotation marks omitted), 
and a still greater number have strong implicit Democratic or Republican leanings that shape 
their political judgments in ways they do not expressly report, see Carlee Beth Hawkins & Brian 
A. Nosek, Motivated Independence? Implicit Party Identity Predicts Political Judgments Among 
Self-Proclaimed Independents, 38 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1437 (2012).  It is 
notable that these individuals refuse to visibly identify with a political party, but given that most 
Americans are party-identified and most Independents are closet, or at least subconscious, parti-
sans, I do not address that curiosity further here.  
 158 E.g., ROGERS M. SMITH, CIVIC IDEALS 493 (1997) (“Few findings in political science are 
as heavily supported as the tenacity of party identification . . . .”).  On the formation of partisan 
identity, see supra notes 34–39 and accompanying text. 
 159 See, e.g., Bartels, supra note 37, at 117 (presenting evidence of partisan bias in political per-
ception); Cohen, supra note 38 (finding that party identification shapes individuals’ views on so-
cial policies); Goren, supra note 36, at 894 (finding that party identification shapes individuals’ 
core political values, their “most abstract and enduring beliefs about society and public affairs”). 
 160 GREEN ET AL., supra note 6, at 78.  Although this is not Green and his colleagues’ point, it 
may be that these identities are similar not only because the former is more durable and meaning-
ful to individuals than commonly assumed, but also because the latter is more fluid and contin-
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This is not to say that partisanship follows from and expresses these 
other social identities.  While individuals may become partisans in part 
by virtue of their membership in other social groups,161 party identifi-
cation is not reducible to these other memberships.162  It is a distinct 
social identity, serving, in psychological terms, as “part of an individu-
al’s self-concept which derives from his knowledge of his membership 
of a social group . . . together with the value and emotional signifi-
cance attached to that membership.”163  Partisanship generates both 
personal understandings and communal attachments. 
Three related points about partisanship as a sociopolitical identity 
bear particular emphasis.  First, our sense of what it means to be an 
American, our national identity, is mediated by partisanship.  In the 
words of two social psychologists, “Red and Blue have become distinct 
ways of being ‘American.’”164  The Democratic and Republican parties 
offer competing narratives about triumphs and challenges in all realms 
of public life — the economic, the social, the moral.165  When they do 
so successfully, their “normative vision also becomes part of the sense 
of identity of their allegiants.”166  Democrats and Republicans thus 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
gent.  A significant body of work has destabilized understandings of racial, ethnic, and religious 
identities as given and fixed, rather than constructed and continuously negotiated, and has em-
phasized that ethnicity is better understood not as preceding and standing outside politics but  
rather as being activated and mobilized by it.  See, e.g., ROGERS BRUBAKER, ETHNICITY 
WITHOUT GROUPS (2004).  If purportedly strong forms of identity are weaker than often  
assumed, however, then something that may not even seem to be an identity — partisanship — 
may have a stronger force than often assumed.  Without positing equivalence, it seems fair to  
understand both ethnic and partisan identifications as not fixed but nonetheless quite powerful 
once mobilized.  If drawing on our assumptions about ethnicity helps us to understand the power 
of partisanship, as Green and his colleagues would have it, it also seems that drawing on our  
assumptions about partisanship could yield new thinking about federal polities divided along eth-
nic lines.  
 161 See supra note 34. 
 162 That said, there is a worrisome racialization of the parties underway in the United States.  
See, e.g., Kerry L. Haynie & Candis S. Watts, Blacks and the Democratic Party: A Resilient Coa-
lition, in NEW DIRECTIONS IN AMERICAN POLITICAL PARTIES 93, 105 (Jeffrey M. Stonecash 
ed., 2010) (arguing that current trends could “leave us with one party that is overwhelmingly 
white and one that is mostly made up of racial and ethnic minorities”). 
 163 Henri Tajfel, Social Categorization, Social Identity and Social Comparison, in DIFFEREN-
TIATION BETWEEN SOCIAL GROUPS 61, 63 (Henri Tajfel ed., 1978) (emphasis omitted); see al-
so, e.g., GREEN ET AL., supra note 6, at ix (“[P]arty identification is a genuine form of social iden-
tification.”); ROSENBLUM, supra note 6, at 343 (“[P]artisanship is a distinct identity, and 
participation as a partisan is a form of identity politics.”). 
 164 Abraham M. Rutchick & Collette P. Eccleston, Ironic Effects of Invoking Common Ingroup 
Identity, 32 BASIC & APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 109, 111 (2010). 
 165 See ROSENBLUM, supra note 6, at 358–59. 
 166 SMITH, supra note 158, at 495; cf. Anthony D. Smith, Gastronomy or Geology? The Role of 
Nationalism in the Reconstruction of Nations, 1 NATIONS & NATIONALISM 3, 19 (1995) (argu-
ing that nationalists are “political archaeologists rediscovering and reinterpreting the communal 
past in order to regenerate the community”). 
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understand both the national polity and themselves as Americans 
through the lens of partisanship.167 
Second, as with all social identities, partisan identity generates, and 
relies upon the existence of, both an in-group and an out-group.  The 
partisan in-group is a big one: for Democrats and Republicans alike, it 
includes nearly half of the nation’s population.  Largely for this reason, 
commentators frequently discuss partisanship as a source of crosscut-
ting identity in the United States.168  By cementing ties among a large 
and diverse group of individuals who will never meet face to face, par-
tisanship helps to foster a sense of national community.169  But the out-
group is just as important as the in-group, and just as substantial.  
Precisely because it involves “the choice of comrades,”170 partisan iden-
tity “is defined in terms of ‘the other.’”171  Partisanship divides us even 
as it unites us, and the division between Democrats and Republicans 
has only grown more pronounced in recent decades.  While polariza-
tion is most apparent among elected officials, it extends across the poli-
ty.172  Ideology and partisanship have become more aligned across the 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 167 See, e.g., Zachary P. Hohman et al., Identity and Intergroup Leadership: Asymmetrical Po-
litical and National Identification in Response to Uncertainty, 9 SELF & IDENTITY 113, 122–23 
(2010); Rutchick & Eccleston, supra note 164, at 113; cf. Penelope Sheets et al., God and Country: 
The Partisan Psychology of the Presidency, Religion, and Nation, 32 POL. PSYCHOL. 459, 472 
(2011) (finding that Democrats rated Obama as more “American” than McCain, while Republi-
cans rated McCain as more “American” than Obama); Mary E. Stuckey, One Nation (Pretty 
Darn) Divisible: National Identity in the 2004 Conventions, 8 RHETORIC & PUB. AFF. 639 
(2005) (arguing that Democrats and Republicans presented very different visions of American na-
tional identity during the 2004 conventions).  Partisanship is not, of course, the only mediating 
variable in defining national identity.  See, e.g., Jack Citrin et al., The Meaning of American Na-
tional Identity: Patterns of Ethnic Conflict and Consensus, in SOCIAL IDENTITY, INTERGROUP 
CONFLICT, AND CONFLICT REDUCTION 71, 84–86 (Richard D. Ashmore et al. eds., 2001) (sug-
gesting that black and white Americans have different beliefs about what constitutes American 
identity). 
 168 See, e.g., Ethan J. Leib & Christopher S. Elmendorf, Why Party Democrats Need Popular 
Democracy and Popular Democrats Need Parties, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 69, 89 (2012) (arguing that 
parties “allow Southerners and Northerners, rich and poor, whites and minorities, and Christians 
and Muslims to feel that they are connected in a shared or overlapping political narrative”); see 
also ROSENBLUM, supra note 6, at 356–57; cf. Jackson, supra note 71, at 2221–23 (discussing fed-
eralism in similar terms). 
 169 Cf. BENEDICT ANDERSON, IMAGINED COMMUNITIES 6–7 (rev. ed. 2006) (positing na-
tions as imagined communities because “the members of even the smallest nation will never know 
most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the 
image of their communion,” id. at 6, and as imagined communities because “the nation is always 
conceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship,” id. at 7). 
 170 WALZER, supra note 34, at 128 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 171 ROSENBLUM, supra note 6, at 365. 
 172 Even those who dispute mass polarization agree that liberals and conservatives have in-
creasingly been “‘sorting’ . . . into the ‘correct’ parties.”  MORRIS P. FIORINA ET AL., CULTURE 
WAR?, at xiii (3d ed. 2011); see also id. at 9, 61–69.  But there is, in addition, evidence of polariza-
tion among the electorate.  For instance, while Fiorina argues that Americans are not divided on 
abortion because most Americans believe abortion should be available in some but not all cases, 
eighty-eight percent of active Democrats who care about abortion consider themselves pro-choice, 
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electorate, and the more Americans are engaged in the political pro-
cess, the more polarized they are; the more they care about divisive is-
sues, like abortion, same-sex marriage, and health care, the more po-
larized they are.173  Especially as Americans increasingly associate only 
with fellow partisans, the line between the partisan in-group and out-
group breeds mutual suspicion, not just a friendly contest in even-
numbered years.174 
Third, many political activities are fundamentally acts of identifica-
tion.  When Americans vote, work for campaigns, and otherwise en-
gage politically, they seek not only to achieve particular policy out-
comes, but also to support their “team.”175  In reaffirming their 
partisan group, Americans also reaffirm their personal identity and  
belonging in a political community.  But this makes the stakes of elec-
tions particularly high.  Losing the presidency, especially, may mean 
not only living under policies one does not favor, but also a deeper 
sense of alienation that may threaten the security of our national iden-
tity, our feelings of belonging to and affinity with the nation.176 
C.  Identifying with States 
Consider, to make that last point a little more concrete, the seces-
sion talk that followed President Obama’s reelection.  Texas led the 
charge.  As a petition asking permission for the Lone Star State to 
withdraw from the United States gathered signatures,177 “Secede” 
bumper stickers started selling like hotcakes, and a 2014 gubernatorial 
candidate changed his middle name to “SECEDE.”178  While the fever 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
while eighty-four percent of active Republicans who care about abortion consider themselves pro-
life.  ABRAMOWITZ, supra note 26, at 73; see also Layman et al., supra note 12, at 89–90. 
 173 ABRAMOWITZ, supra note 26, at 8; see also Erikson et al., supra note 28. 
 174 See, e.g., BILL BISHOP WITH ROBERT G. CUSHING, THE BIG SORT 14 (2008). 
 175 GREEN ET AL., supra note 6, at 83, 219; see also id. at 206 (“Elections affirm and empower 
the social groups that comprise the winning party. . . . [E]lections represent more than simply a 
competition between candidates and rival platforms.  Elections are also forums for intergroup 
competition.”). 
 176 See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER J. ANDERSON ET AL., LOSERS’ CONSENT 82–83 (2005) (show-
ing that the loss of a presidential election has a pronounced effect on partisans’ trust in govern-
ment); Hohman et al., supra note 167, at 122–23 (finding that Democrats disidentified from the 
nation when asked to read a speech by Republican President George W. Bush that made them 
feel uncertain, while Republicans identified more strongly with the nation under the same condi-
tion); cf. Rutchick & Eccleston, supra note 164, at 115 (showing that being encouraged by a mem-
ber of the opposing party to think about national identity emphasizes partisan differences). 
 177 Peacefully Grant the State of Texas to Withdraw from the United States of America and 
Create Its Own NEW Government, WE THE PEOPLE (Nov. 9, 2012), https://petitions.whitehouse 
. g o v / p e t i t i o n / p e a c e f u l l y - g r a n t - s t a t e - t e x a s - w i t h d r a w - u n i t e d - s t a t e s - a m e r i c a - a n d - c r e a t e - i t s - o w n  
-new-government/BmdWCP8B. 
 178 Manny Fernandez, With Stickers, a Petition and Even a Middle Name, Secession Fever 
Hits Texas, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 24, 2012, at A12. 
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ran hottest in Texas, residents of other red states including Alabama, 
Georgia, Louisiana, and Tennessee also evinced secessionist ambitions.179 
Whether one regards such activity as tragic, comic, or tragicom-
ic,180 it gestures toward something important about the relationship 
among partisanship, federalism, and political identity.  Note that when 
Republican President Bush won reelection, there was no talk of Texas 
seceding.  There were, though, Democrats across the country who 
made the case for joining their states to Canada.181  Note, too, that 
with a Democratic President’s reelection, petition signatories and 
bumper-sticker bearers are not turning their backs on government al-
together or focusing on emigration as an individual matter.  Instead, 
they are looking to the states.  Eight years ago, after President Bush 
won reelection, it was Democrats who felt alienated from the federal 
government and, in looking to “secede emotionally,” focused on a dif-
ferent group of states.182 
In short, such activity illustrates how states function as sites of par-
tisan identification.183  When one’s party holds power at the national 
level, states may seem relatively unimportant, but when the other par-
ty takes over, they become salient.  Federalism matters both for fur-
thering policy ends and for anchoring political identity.  While seces-
sion is a noteworthy trope, the actions that states and their inhabitants 
take while remaining squarely within the Union are more powerful 
than rhetoric.  When President Bush held office, Democrats sought to 
protect same-sex marriage, provide safe harbors for undocumented 
immigrants, and expand health care at the state level.  With President 
Obama in office, Republicans are working to curtail same-sex mar-
riage, limit unlawful immigration, and hinder the implementation of 
the Affordable Care Act at the state level.184 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 179 See Alexandra Jaffe, White House Responds to Secession Petitions, Calls for Unity Instead, 
THE HILL (Jan. 12, 2013, 3:01 PM), http://thehill.com/blogs/blog-briefing-room/news/276817 
-white-house-responds-to-secession-petitions.  Meanwhile blue cities like Austin counter-petitioned 
to secede from these red states and remain a part of the Union.  See Richard Whittaker, Dear 
Obama, If Texas Secedes, Can We Stay with You?, AUSTIN CHRON. (Nov. 14, 2012, 11:26 AM),  
ht t p : / / w w w . a u s t i n c h r o n i c l e . c o m / b l o g s / n e w s / 2 0 1 2 - 1 1 - 1 4 / d e a r - o b a m a - i f - t e x a s - s e c e d e s - c a n - w e - s t a y 
-with-you. 
 180 Compare, e.g., FEELEY & RUBIN, supra note 5, at 39 (“[F]ederalism is connected with the 
tragic aspect of politics.”), with Fernandez, supra note 178 (noting that Texas’s secession talk pro-
vides “comic relief” for some). 
 181 See, e.g., ANDREW GELMAN ET AL., RED STATE, BLUE STATE, RICH STATE, POOR 
STATE 112 fig.8.1 (2008) (reprinting a “widely circulated” cartoon map showing the “United 
States of Canada” and “Jesusland”). 
 182 Franklin Foer, Essay, The Joy of Federalism, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6, 2005, at F12.  Foer ar-
gues that liberal federalists turned to the states to obtain “psychic relief from the alienation” they 
felt upon President Bush’s reelection.  Id. 
 183 For empirical evidence supporting this assertion, see infra notes 193–99 and accompanying text. 
 184 See supra section I.B, pp. 1096–108. 
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Running still deeper, when one’s party is out of power at the na-
tional level, federalism offers an institutional framework for partisan 
identification.185  Americans who feel alienated from the national gov-
ernment can turn to the states and know that there are government in-
stitutions controlled by their team.186  In Feeley and Rubin’s terms, 
when Americans are alienated from the national government because 
the other party is in control, federalism enables them to “divide loyalty 
and rechannel action” and motivates them to remain involved in the 
political arena.187  The states are not, for these Americans, something 
different in kind from the federal government; instead, they represent 
the “real” America at a time when the federal government fails to do 
so.188  As a different popular bumper sticker — the one sold in Massa-
chusetts after President Nixon was reelected with the Electoral College 
votes of every other state — put it, “Nixon 49, America 1.”  This ren-
dering captures a more pervasive phenomenon: on partisan grounds, 
states become stand-ins for the nation. 
Partisan state identification thus does not inhere in something cate-
gorically distinctive about the states vis-à-vis the federal government.  
Instead, it follows from their shared ability to represent the political 
parties — but the divergence in how they do so at any given time.  
The significance of partisanship to state identification suggests a dif-
ferent read on a worry often noted in legal and political science com-
mentary: that voters rely on their national partisan preferences in state 
elections.189  V.O. Key’s quip that “[t]he governmental system may be 
federal but the voter in the polling booth usually is not”190 and David 
Schleicher’s more recent work on “mismatch,”191 among other ac-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 185 Despite suggestions that Americans may identify differently with the political parties at the 
state and national levels, surveys show almost no discrepancy between state and national party 
identification.  GREEN ET AL., supra note 6, at 44–46.  
 186 See ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 176, at 138–39 (arguing that electoral losers on the cen-
tral level in a federal system are more satisfied than losers in unitary systems because they can 
win in states); GREEN ET AL., supra note 6, at 219 (emphasizing “partisans’ sense that they are 
part of a team”). 
 187 FEELEY & RUBIN, supra note 5, at 15. 
 188 Cf. Mark Tushnet, Comment, What Then Is the American?, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 873, 877 
(1996) (suggesting that state-based identifications are often rejections of alternative identities asso-
ciated with other states and thus serve as assertions “of a desired alternative universalist culture”). 
 189 See, e.g., DUANE LOCKARD, THE POLITICS OF STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT 165 
(2d ed. 1969); Thomas M. Carsey & Gerald C. Wright, State and National Factors in Gubernato-
rial and Senatorial Elections, 42 AM. J. POL. SCI. 994, 1001 (1998); Christopher S. Elmendorf & 
David Schleicher, Informing Consent: Voter Ignorance, Political Parties, and Election Law, 2013 
U. ILL. L. REV. 363, 393–408; Steven Michael Rogers, Accountability in a Federal System (Sept. 
2013) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Princeton University), available at http://dataspace 
.princeton.edu/jspui/bitstream/88435/dsp01m326m185z/1/Rogers_princeton_0181D_10709.pdf. 
 190 V.O. KEY, JR., AMERICAN STATE POLITICS 33 (1956). 
 191 See, e.g., David Schleicher, From Here All-the-Way-Down, or How to Write a Festschrift 
Piece, 48 TULSA L. REV. 401 (2013); David Schleicher, Why Is There No Partisan Competition in 
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counts, might seem to furnish powerful evidence for Feeley and  
Rubin’s claim that state identification is illusory and our federalism 
vestigial: If Americans do not conceptualize state and national govern-
ance as distinct or attend to unique currents of state politics, how can 
we say they identify with the states? 
But the very fact that states are fungible in voters’ minds with the 
nation may make them powerful independent sites of identification.  
Key’s “nonfederal” voters pose a challenge to views of state identity 
grounded in ethnocultural uniqueness, but they undergird partisan 
federalism.  Given the role of the states in staging partisan competi-
tion, individuals may reasonably regard state elections as outlets for 
their national political preferences.192  Moreover, insofar as political 
activity is driven by a broader desire to support one’s partisan team, 
state as well as federal elections enable Americans to reaffirm both 
their political group and their own identities.  And the states may loom 
particularly large in these individuals’ minds when their party is out of 
power at the national level. 
It is not surprising, then, that polls on Americans’ views of federal-
ism show that support for state and federal governments varies de-
pending on which party holds office.  When Democrats control the 
federal government, for instance, Republicans view the states much 
more favorably — but only when Republicans are in charge at the 
state level.193  Indeed, partisanship drives whether Americans blame 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
City Council Elections?: The Role of Election Law, 23 J.L. & POL. 419 (2007); see also Elmendorf 
& Schleicher, supra note 189.  Schleicher argues that the political parties are national coalitions 
that do not compete for local voters based on issues specific to state and local government, yet 
voters nonetheless rely on their national partisan preferences in casting state and local ballots, 
creating what he calls a “mismatch problem.” 
 192 See generally supra Part I, pp. 1082–108.  In other words, voters are not necessarily 
“[o]blivious” or “confused” if they base their state-level votes on the parties’ national positions.  
Elmendorf & Schleicher, supra note 189, at 368.  They may be responding to the states’ vital role 
in national partisan conflict.  I certainly don’t mean that no voters are oblivious or confused.  
Elmendorf, Schleicher, and others are quite persuasive about voter apathy and ignorance.  But 
while apathetic and ignorant voters may be a democratic problem, they are not necessarily a fed-
eralism problem in particular.  So too, I don’t mean to deny that there are state-specific political 
questions that voter attention to national currents may elide.  My point is the narrower one that 
voters’ focus on national questions is not incompatible with federalism even as it does not capture 
all of federalism’s dimensions.  Indeed, if voters instead focused only on state-specific issues, they 
also would be missing key aspects of our federalism. 
 193 PEW RESEARCH CTR., GROWING GAP IN FAVORABLE VIEWS OF FEDERAL, STATE 
GOVERNMENTS 2–3 (2012), available at http://www.people-press.org/files/legacy-pdf/4-26-12 
%20Govt%20Favorability.pdf (showing Republican support for the federal government declining 
from 53% to 20% with the presidency changing hands from Republican Bush to Democratic 
Obama, and Republican support for state government standing at 70% when Republicans control 
a given state but at only 33% when Democrats do so); PEW RESEARCH CTR., STATE GOVERN-
MENTS VIEWED FAVORABLY AS FEDERAL RATING HITS NEW LOW 2–3 (2013), available at 
http://www.people-press.org/files/legacy-pdf/4-15-2013%20Government%20Release.pdf (showing 
Republican support for the federal government declining further to 13%, and Republican support 
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their state governor or the President for economic problems.194  So too, 
individuals’ beliefs about whether the state or federal government is 
the proper government to “run . . . things” depend on which party is in 
control at both levels.195  Particularly for Democrats, state autonomy is 
much more attractive when a Republican president holds office.196  In 
the words of one commentator, Americans are “prone to vary their 
support for different levels of government depending on the congru-
ence between officials in power and their own partisanship.”197 
While such partisan identification with states is contingent, it is 
not, in this respect, different from other forms of identification, as il-
luminated by social psychological work on social identity threat.   
Michael Hogg and others have shown that one way group members of 
all kinds respond to threat is to disidentify with the superordinate 
group and identify more strongly at a subgroup level.198  Multiple so-
cial categorization is most often studied with respect to social identities 
such as race, ethnicity, and religion, but it has implications for nation-
alism, federalism, and partisanship as well.  Democrats’ national iden-
tity is threatened when Republicans control the federal government, 
and vice versa; their prototype of “American” is destabilized, and they 
may question their membership in the national group.  Hogg and his 
colleagues, for example, found that Democrats’ national identification 
was diminished after they read a speech by Republican President Bush 
and were asked to focus on those aspects of the speech that made them 
feel uncertain.  Republicans’ national identification was enhanced un-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
at 71% for Republican-led states but 30% for Democratic-led states); see also J. Wesley Leckrone, 
Federalism and Public Opinion, AM. PARTNERSHIP (June 15, 2012), http:// 
theamericanpartnership.com/2012/06/15/federalism-and-public-opinion (“Following previous pub-
lic opinion polling, there is a partisan divide on which level of government is viewed more favor-
ably.  Satisfaction is related to congruence between individual partisan affiliation and the partisan 
composition of the level of government.”).   
 194 Adam R. Brown, Are Governors Responsible for the State Economy? Partisanship, Blame, 
and Divided Federalism, 72 J. POL. 605 (2010). 
 195 PEW RESEARCH CTR., PARTISAN POLARIZATION SURGES IN BUSH, OBAMA YEARS 53 
(2012), available at http://www.people-press.org/files/legacy-pdf/06-04-12%20Values%20Release.pdf. 
 196 During the Reagan and second Bush Presidencies (in 1987 and 2007), more than seventy 
percent of Democrats agreed that “[t]he federal government should run only those things that 
cannot be run at the local level.”  Id.  During the Obama Presidency, Democrats’ support for this 
statement dropped by nearly twenty points.  Id.  While Republicans are generally more support-
ive of local governance, their support varies according to party control as well.  See id.; cf.  
Richard L. Cole & John Kincaid, Public Opinion on U.S. Federal and Intergovernmental Issues in 
2006: Continuity and Change, 36 PUBLIUS 443, 455 (2006) (showing that under a Republican 
President, 78.2% of Republicans, but only 37.4% of Democrats, had a “great deal” or “fair 
amount” of trust in the federal government). 
 197 Leckrone, supra note 193.  For thoughts on the individual whose party is out of power both 
at the national level and in her state, see infra section III.B, pp. 1130–35. 
 198 Michael A. Hogg & Matthew J. Hornsey, Self-Concept Threat and Multiple Categorization 
Within Groups, in MULTIPLE SOCIAL CATEGORIZATION 112, 120 (Richard J. Crisp & Miles 
Hewstone eds., 2006). 
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der the same conditions.199  States are, for Americans whose national 
identity is threatened, a readily available subgroup with which to po-
litically identify.  Even for those who signed Texas’s secession petition, 
it seems, state identification does not require actual departure from the 
United States.  Instead, the possibility of state identification mitigates 
the threat to national identity.  The secession petition performs the so-
lution to the problem it diagnoses. 
As this further suggests, Americans who experience a partisan-
based threat to their national identity may identify with their state as a 
way of retaining a sense of belonging to the national group.  Hogg and 
his colleagues note that if a superordinate group values diversity, iden-
tifying with a subgroup need not yield schism.200  Federalism renders 
diversity a defining structural feature of the United States.201  Because 
being an American necessarily means belonging to a state as well as 
national polity, identification with the state may be at once opposition-
al vis-à-vis the nation and a mediated way of identifying with the na-
tion even in the face of partisan threat.202  In this sense, partisanship 
adds a motivational, individually oriented element to accounts that 
cast difference and discord as potentially integrative aspects of nation-
al democracy.203  In contrast to Charles Fried’s pithy suggestion that 
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 199 Hohman et al., supra note 167.  Hogg and his colleagues summarize one implication of their 
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“[i]f we became more Virginian, we would be less American,”204 this 
understanding casts becoming more Virginian as a way of being more 
American: When one’s national identity is threatened by partisan divi-
sion, states are a site of identification that admits of both immediate 
opposition and higher-order allegiance to the nation.  Americans can 
affiliate with states governed by their political party as a means of en-
gaging with national politics rather than turning away from it.  And 
partisan identification always holds open the future prospect of identi-
fying more strongly with the national government than the state. 
Ultimately, partisanship underscores both the possibility and the 
significance of a fluid form of state identification.  Loyalty to the states 
need not, on this view, be primordial, stable, or felt equally by the en-
tire population.  Taking partisanship as a primary mechanism of state-
based identification suggests that at any given time only a subset of 
the population will be focused on the states and that the members of 
this subset will change over time depending on national political de-
velopments.  But some individuals will always direct affinity and loy-
alty toward the states, and most politically engaged Americans should 
at some point find themselves among these individuals. 
III.  HORIZONTAL NATIONALISM 
If partisan federalism involves political actors’ use of the state and 
federal governments to wage competition between the political parties, 
and individuals’ attendant identification with the states, this Article 
has thus far advanced a top-down, vertical conception of the phenom-
enon.  Partisan competition, Part I suggested, involves lines drawn by 
national party politics and transmitted to the states.  State-based iden-
tification, Part II suggested, follows from alienation from the federal 
government, as Americans’ political allegiances shift from the nation 
to their states of residence.  This Part complicates both claims by 
bringing additional possibilities inherent in federal diversity into view.  
Supplementing the vertical and top-down with the horizontal and  
bottom-up, I argue that contemporary American federalism involves 
slippage between state and federal authority and the prospect of indi-
vidual affiliation with a variety of states. 
Section III.A elaborates on Part I, noting how federalism shapes 
and bolsters our political parties, and not just the reverse.  Taking “the 
national” to be formulated through both state and federal politics, this 
section argues that states can serve as sites of national political contest 
without forfeiting — even if they complicate understandings of — the 
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 204 Charles Fried, The Supreme Court, 1994 Term — Foreword: Revolutions?, 109 HARV. L. 
REV. 13, 13 (1995); cf. RIKER, supra note 8, at 104–05 (suggesting that individuals choose between 
state and national identification). 
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particularity and pluralism for which we value the local.  Section III.B 
elaborates on Part II, suggesting that insofar as partisanship motivates 
state-based identification, individuals may meaningfully affiliate  
with states in which they do not reside.  The states are different from 
both the federal government and each other, but they participate in 
controversies that are national in scope on behalf of the nation’s peo-
ple at large. 
A.  Federalism as a Safeguard of Parties 
By motivating both state-federal contestation and individual identi-
fication with the states, partisanship serves federalism.  But if our two 
political parties help perpetuate American federalism, the reverse is al-
so true: federalism helps perpetuate the Democratic and Republican 
parties.  The coexistence of fifty-one governments means that neither 
party is ever wholly out of power and that each party’s internal diver-
sity may be expressed in governance decisions.  In a time of party po-
larization, federalism bounds the loss of political losers.  In a time of 
party cohesion, federalism means there is still some play in each par-
ty’s joints. 
1.  Keeping the Losing Side Alive. — As others have noted, the 
United States’ federal structure helps each party survive when it is out 
of power at the national level.205  When Republicans rule in Washing-
ton, Democrats can build a record in state capitals, positioning them-
selves to regain federal power, and vice versa.206  State politicians have 
a ready springboard into national office; many of our presidents have 
come to the White House from the governor’s mansion.207 
But the states are not merely “refueling stations”208 that allow par-
ties to establish their bona fides before returning to the national stage.  
State governance is, as I have argued, itself a means of participating in 
national partisan politics.  The coexistence of state and federal gov-
ernments ensures that the party out of power in Washington may  
continue to participate in national politics not only through minority 
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 205 See, e.g., DAVID L. SHAPIRO, FEDERALISM: A DIALOGUE 115 (1995) (describing states as 
“refueling stations” for the party out of power at the national level); Akhil Reed Amar, Some New 
World Lessons for the Old World, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 483, 504 (1991) (“[S]tates furnish opponents 
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 206 See, e.g., Amar, supra note 205, at 504; Young, supra note 205, at 60–61. 
 207 Recent examples include George W. Bush, Bill Clinton, Ronald Reagan, and Jimmy Carter.  
Barack Obama got his start as a state legislator.  
 208 SHAPIRO, supra note 205, at 115. 
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opposition in Congress but also through affirmative acts of state  
governance.209 
Moreover, just as partisanship bolsters federalism by making 
Americans invested in states,210 federalism bolsters partisanship by 
providing infrastructure for partisan allegiance.  Nancy Rosenblum’s 
defense of partisanship as “the political identity of representative de-
mocracy” argues that partisanship furnishes the comfort of solidarity 
to political losers and the knowledge of contingency and temporariness 
to political winners and losers alike.211  States provide an institutional 
mechanism for partisanship to do this work.212  Federalism enables 
party actors to keep the “losing side alive” by carrying out their party 
platform through state governments.213  So too, federalism means that 
partisans on the losing side of a national election need not see their 
“minority status as irreversible” in part because they are not a minority 
everywhere.214  Federalism helps make visible and concrete that nei-
ther party speaks for the whole, and it ensures that there are, at all 
times, multiple government fora for partisan affiliation. 
2.  States as Laboratories of Partisan Politics. — These multiple 
government fora point to a second way federalism serves the political 
parties: it offers scope for intraparty, as well as interparty, competition 
and variation.  The Democratic and Republican parties look strikingly 
uniform throughout the country compared to their historical incarna-
tions.215  Yet if it is an overstatement today to characterize our two-
party system as “more like a hundred-party system,”216 there nonethe-
less remain disagreements about policies and priorities within each 
party.  Federalism makes it easier for the parties to accommodate such 
internal diversity, whether or not it is ultimately rooted in differences 
between the states as such.  Even without regional parties,217 that is, 
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 209 See supra Part I, pp. 1082–108. 
 210 See supra Part II, pp. 1108–22. 
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federalism renders the parties more supple in shaping and advancing 
their agendas and in attracting and maintaining individuals’ loyalty. 
Return, for instance, to the examples of state-federal contestation in 
Part I.  The main axis of conflict is interpartisan: working through 
both the states and the federal government, Democrats and Republi-
cans fight over health care, same-sex marriage, abortion, global warm-
ing, stem cell research, welfare, and immigration.  But there are finer-
grained intrapartisan debates with respect to these issues as well.  
While the most visible conflicts are spurred by states governed by the 
party out of power in Washington, states governed by the party in 
power in Washington also offer opposing views of that party’s position.  
As Arizona and copycat red states attacked President Obama’s Demo-
cratic administration on immigration, Massachusetts, New York, and 
Illinois engaged in uncooperative federalism from the left, resisting the 
administration’s Secure Communities program.218  As the Republican 
Governor of Wisconsin fought with President Clinton’s Democratic 
administration about the contours of welfare, the Democratic Gover-
nor of Washington was attempting to push existing welfare policy in a 
more liberal direction.219  As blue states encouraged embryonic stem 
cell research in the face of Republican President Bush’s federal ban, 
Republican state actors who were aligned with business interests dis-
sented from the Christian conservative position adopted by the Presi-
dent.220  Intraparty disputes about abortion, environmental protection 
measures, and other controversial issues also play out in the states, 
even as they are frequently overshadowed by interparty disputes. 
Perhaps more important than offering platforms for outright 
intrapartisan conflict, the states offer platforms for a greater variety of 
party positions to take root.  Even a party that controls the presidency 
and Congress will only accomplish, and attempt to accomplish, so 
much at the national level.  Partisan obstruction generates substantial 
gridlock even in periods of unified government.  Floor time and other 
temporal constraints limit which proposals get attention.  Federal poli-
ticians lack interest in or appetite for taking on a host of issues.  By 
multiplying sites of governance, states enable a greater number of par-
tisan positions to be advanced, and to be formulated in the first place.  
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In federalism parlance, states serve as “laboratories” of national parti-
san politics.221 
Some might resist this characterization as oxymoronic.  The very 
notion of laboratories, the argument goes, inheres in organic local dif-
ference and grassroots problem-solving, and these features are absent 
from state experimentation framed by national partisan struggle.222  
But the laboratory metaphor always presupposes the national: what 
makes the states laboratories is the hope that a successful experiment 
will spread nationwide or that a dangerous one will not.223  Partisan-
ship extends the metaphor’s national reference point back in time, 
casting state actions as national actions in the present moment.224  
States implement a variety of governmental visions that emerge from 
national political contests but that cannot all be instantiated at the na-
tional level.  In its starkest form, this is a laboratories account of the 
Republican-Democratic contestation described in Part I: the Republi-
can and Democratic positions on particular issues cannot both be im-
plemented at the national level, and so states contesting national policy 
on a particular issue are often serving simultaneously as competitors to 
the federal government and as laboratories of national partisan poli-
tics.  But attention to the formation of positions within the parties 
themselves offers a richer account of states as laboratories.  While still 
hinging on national political struggle, it underscores that this struggle 
is not an exclusively top-down, Washington-centric affair; in an era of 
networked parties, a variety of actors — politicians, interest groups, 
activists, consultants, and others — push competing partisan agendas 
through state and national sites.225 
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States are critical laboratories for national party struggle because 
they differ from both the federal government and each other in a vari-
ety of respects.  Some relevant differences can be traced to ways in 
which cultural and regional distinctiveness mediate partisanship.  
Even today, the West Virginia Democratic Party is not the Massachu-
setts Democratic Party (even as it is not the West Virginia Republican 
Party), nor is the New York Republican Party the Oklahoma Republi-
can Party (even as it is not the New York Democratic Party).226  But a 
host of more contingent phenomena are also important.  Some states 
have unified party government, while others have divided party gov-
ernment.  Some state governors and legislators have ambition for na-
tional political office, while others do not.  Variation that only tangen-
tially relates to partisanship also influences the kinds of policies state 
actors will embrace.  A state’s population size and composition, its ge-
ography and natural resources, its professional or citizen legislature — 
these and other characteristics all shape state decisionmaking even in a 
time of nationalized politics.227  Especially insofar as state diversity re-
flects crosscutting forms of national diversity and contingent practical 
differences, it is best understood as enlarging the scope of national ac-
tion.  States need not be organically distinct to experiment or to differ 
from one another; national heterogeneity is reflected in state decisions. 
States often serve as laboratories, for example, by giving concrete 
form to a position that has a national partisan valence but is not em-
bodied in federal policy.  Sometimes a handful of states, or even a sin-
gle state, define and promote a party’s stance on a particular issue.  
California has advanced the Democratic position with respect to global 
warming and emissions standards, while Arizona has been the  
standard-bearer for the Republican Party on immigration.228  Other 
times, a wide variety of states participate in developing the national 
vision with respect to a particular issue.  For many years now, the 
Democratic and Republican positions on guns have been framed by 
the states in the absence of federal action.  Certain states require back-
ground checks, limit bulk purchases of firearms, ban assault weapons, 
or regulate large-capacity magazines.229  Other states authorize school 
employees to carry guns, require employers to allow guns in the work-
place, or limit law enforcement discretion to deny concealed-carry 
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permits.230  The national partisan cleavage is clear, but it is principally 
state, not federal, politicians who have shaped it.  And while the main 
divide is between the two parties, states governed by the same party 
also differ in their substantive policies and the relative attention they 
pay to gun-related issues.231 
More generally, many issues that are branded “state” rather than 
“national” questions — insofar as state governments rather than the 
federal government are addressing them — are best understood as na-
tional experiments carried out within state fora.  From fracking to in-
state tuition for undocumented immigrants; from charter schools to tax 
rates; from public sector unions to takings for economic develop-
ment — states serving as laboratories for these issues are participating 
in national partisan struggle.  Even as they undertake discrete actions, 
state actors are motivated by partisan commitments that transcend 
state borders.  And their experiments are often adopted by other states 
along partisan lines, as organizations like the Republican and Demo-
cratic Governors Associations and the American Legislative Exchange 
Council cross-pollinate.  As multiple states flesh out one party’s posi-
tion, composite subnational action comes to define the national.  States 
generate a horizontal nationalism that is no less national for being  
bottom-up rather than top-down.232 
In time, moreover, such bottom-up partisan activity can force fed-
eral politicians’ hands or make it attractive for them to take a position 
they once feared might amount to political suicide.  State decisions 
both fuel and reflect proposed lines of partisan division, and there is 
slippage between state and federal politics, as state and federal actors 
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self-consciously treat states as testing grounds for national policies.233  
Today, for instance, the national Democratic Party embraces same-sex 
marriage, but only following a partisan contest in the states.  As a 
small and then growing number of blue states adopted marriage equal-
ity, same-sex marriage became a Democratic issue at the national level.  
For some federal politicians, state politics forced the issue.  For others, 
state politics provided cover for a position they already favored.  They 
could cautiously advance the mantra of federalism, rather than sup-
port for same-sex marriage as such, and when it turned out their con-
stituents supported same-sex marriage, move to a fuller-throated  
endorsement of equality.  As same-sex marriage has become a Demo-
cratic issue at the national level, moreover, additional blue states are 
taking up the cause, shoring up the base of national support and, at 
least for now, the national partisan valence. 
Debates about the legalization of marijuana also have something of 
this character.  Recent ballot initiatives in Colorado and Washington 
have legalized recreational marijuana under state law, a group of most-
ly blue states has decriminalized possession of small amounts of mari-
juana, still more states have decriminalized medicinal marijuana, and 
a growing number of state Democratic parties and politicians now en-
dorse legalization.234  Such state activity puts pressure on the national 
Democratic Party to follow suit, or — more likely in the short term — 
to adopt a modus vivendi approach to state legalization.235  As with 
same-sex marriage, moreover, federalism gives national politicians who 
favor legalization a lower-stakes way to advance this substantive posi-
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tion: calling for respect for state decisionmaking has a different ring 
than calling for outright legalization.236  If popular support for legali-
zation continues to grow, national politicians can transform arguments 
for federalism into arguments about ending the United States’ war on 
drugs, but they will not have committed to this position if popular 
support wanes.  Marijuana has an emerging, if still contested, national 
partisan valence — but it is one that is being generated by state, not 
national, action. 
B.  Identifying with Other States 
The way in which states serve as pluralistic sites of national politi-
cal contest raises an intriguing possibility: that state-based identifica-
tion need not be limited to one’s own state of residence.  While federal-
ism scholarship often seeks state identification in exceptionalism, I 
have argued that it is in some sense the unexceptional — the ways in 
which the states and the federal government occupy the same political 
space — that generates today’s state-based identification.  By embody-
ing different national partisan positions, the states become distinct 
from the federal government and from each other, but they become 
distinct in ways likely to resonate with individuals throughout the na-
tion.  No state has a homogenous population, in partisan terms or oth-
erwise, and no state’s instantiation of the national will successfully 
represents all of its residents.  The fact that the states and the federal 
government offer different answers to the same questions thus raises 
the possibility that Americans may find in federalism multiple sites for 
their national allegiance. 
Start with the simplest case from Part II: individuals whose party 
is out of power at the national level.  If states are a key site of partisan 
attachment for these people, as I have argued, our map is poorly 
drawn.  We speak of blue states and red states, but, as often quipped, 
all of the states are purple.237  Even in those states that give “land-
slide” victories to Republican presidential nominees, a significant per-
centage of voters cast a ballot for the Democratic nominee, and vice 
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conflict). 
 237 See, e.g., SCHAPIRO, supra note 12, at 30 (“Federalism is not an answer to the problem of 
how a blue nation and a red nation can inhabit the same country in peace.  That problem does 
not exist because a blue nation and a red nation do not exist.”).  Contra Schapiro, I am suggesting 
that federalism is an answer to this problem — not because blue states are perfectly blue and red 
states are perfectly red, but instead because there are both blue and red states, and blue and red 
people inhabiting each state, and people in any given state can look to multiple states as well as to 
the federal government for representation. 
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versa.238  California and Massachusetts may be deep blue states in 
popular consciousness, but each gave almost forty percent of the vote 
to Romney in 2012.239  Likewise, Texas and Kansas may strike us as 
crimson, but more than a third of their votes went to Obama.240  Gu-
bernatorial races, too, are often closely contested,241 and every state 
legislature contains representatives from both parties.242  Throughout 
the country, cities tend to be blue, while rural areas tend to be red.243  
And on and on.244 
Among other things, this means that a substantial minority of any 
state’s population will not identify politically with the party in power 
at the state level.  While many residents may look to their own state as 
a site of partisan affiliation and identity, for others, doing so will yield 
little solace, and may even compound a sense of political alienation if 
they find themselves in both the state and national minority.245  I have 
suggested that the Democrat living in Massachusetts during the Bush 
Presidency and the Republican living in Texas during the Obama Pres-
idency have particular reason to identify with their states.246  But what 
comfort is federalism for the Republican in Massachusetts and the 
Democrat in Texas?  While the Republican in Massachusetts during 
the Bush Presidency and the Democrat in Texas during the Obama 
Presidency enjoy one level of government controlled by their political  
 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 238 In the 2012 presidential election, for instance, the most lopsided state vote for Romney was 
Utah’s seventy-three percent, compared to twenty-five percent for Obama.  The most lopsided 
state vote for Obama was Hawaii’s seventy-one percent, compared to twenty-eight percent for 
Romney.  Election 2012: President Results, N.Y. TIMES, http://elections.nytimes.com/2012/results 
/president/big-board (last updated Nov. 29, 2012).  Ninety-one percent of Washington, D.C.’s vote 
went to Obama, id., one reason why D.C.’s quest for statehood is a nonstarter in a hyperpolarized 
United States.  
 239 Id. 
 240 Id. 
 241 See, e.g., 2012 Governor Races, POLITICO, http://www.politico.com/2012-election/map/# 
/Governor/2012 (last updated Nov. 29, 2012) (providing the election margins for gubernatorial 
races in the 2012 elections); Election 2010: Governor Big Board, N.Y. TIMES, http://elections 
.nytimes.com/2010/results/governor/big-board (last visited Nov. 24, 2013) (providing the election 
margins for gubernatorial races in the 2010 elections). 
 242 Party Composition of State Legislatures, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES, http://www 
.ncsl.org/legislatures-elections/elections/statevote-charts.aspx (last visited Nov. 24, 2013).  Nebras-
ka is an arguable exception, but only because it has an officially nonpartisan legislature.  Id. 
 243 See, e.g., Josh Kron, Red State, Blue City: How the Urban-Rural Divide Is Splitting Ameri-
ca, THE ATLANTIC (Nov. 30, 2012, 11:17 AM), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2012 
/11/red-state-blue-city-how-the-urban-rural-divide-is-splitting-america/265686.  
 244 See, e.g., FIORINA ET AL., supra note 172, at 57 (“California is a blue state, but most of the 
state’s counties are red. Similarly, Texas is a red state, but there is considerable blue in its large 
cities and along its border with Mexico.”). 
 245 See ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 176, at 138 (showing that electoral losers, especially 
strong partisans, distrust their state government if their party is out of power).  
 246 See supra Part II, pp. 1108–22. 
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party and may ground their political identity more firmly in the nation 
than the state,247 there is also the Democrat in Texas during the Bush 
Presidency and the Republican in Massachusetts during the Obama 
Presidency.  What of them? 
In one sense, this is a variation on the minority-within-a-minority 
problem that recurs in all federations.  But partisan federalism sug-
gests a possible answer to this conundrum — those individuals may 
affiliate with states they do not inhabit.  The same forces that amplify 
national partisan conflict and provoke political alienation provide mul-
tiple sites for political attachment.  There are always some states con-
trolled by the party out of power at the national level.  And some 
states are more deeply and consistently blue or red over time.  As these 
states wage national, partisan fights with the federal government, they 
may become focal points not only for their own residents, but for indi-
viduals throughout the country.  Democrats living in Texas during the 
Bush Presidency could look to California’s fight with the federal gov-
ernment over greenhouse gases.  Republicans living in Massachusetts 
during the Obama Presidency could seize on Arizona’s fight with the 
federal government over immigration. 
I am positing, in short, a federalist variant of surrogate representa-
tion.  As Jane Mansbridge has argued, many Americans are represent-
ed in Congress through a surrogate representative “with whom one has 
no electoral relationship — that is, a representative in another dis-
trict.”248  Surrogate representation is particularly important in the 
United States, she suggests, because with single-member districts and 
first-past-the-post, winner-take-all majority elections, many voters lose 
in their own districts.  Surrogate representation plays the “normatively 
critical role of providing representation” to these voters.249  While vot-
ers who lose in their own districts could theoretically be bereft of rep-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 247 Cf. D. Conor Seyle & Matthew L. Newman, A House Divided? The Psychology of Red and 
Blue America, 61 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 571, 574–75 (2006) (noting that the Democratic or Repub-
lican majority in a state is likely to exaggerate its representativeness of the state’s population as a 
whole, while members of the minority party may overestimate their minority status within the 
state). 
 248 Mansbridge, supra note 9, at 522; see id. at 523 (“In the United States, surrogate representa-
tion — a noninstitutional, informal, and chance arrangement — is the preeminent form of non-
territorial representation.”); see also Robert Weissberg, Collective vs. Dyadic Representation in 
Congress, 72 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 535, 535 (1978) (considering “collective representation” — “the 
extent to which Congress as an institution represents the American people”).  Surrogate represen-
tation is frequently invoked with respect to race, sex, and sexual orientation.  See, e.g., CAROL M. 
SWAIN, BLACK FACES, BLACK INTERESTS 217–19 (1993); Mansbridge, supra note 9, at 523.  
But cf. Claudine Gay, Spirals of Trust? The Effect of Descriptive Representation on the Relation-
ship Between Citizens and Their Government, 46 AM. J. POL. SCI. 717, 717 (2002) (finding that 
black constituents place less significance on descriptive representation than do white constituents, 
though they are more likely to contact black representatives).  But the phenomenon extends to 
partisanship as well.  
 249 Mansbridge, supra note 9, at 523. 
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resentation in the federal legislature, the number of elected officials in 
the national legislature, coupled with geographical clustering of inter-
ests and partisan affiliations, ensures that the losers in one district will 
be represented by legislators from other districts.250  Because the Re-
publican living in a Democratic district may feel better represented by 
a Republican member of Congress than by her elected representative, 
surrogate representation “focuses not on the dyadic relation between 
representative and constituent but on the systemwide composition of 
the legislature.”251 
Federalism offers an even broader terrain for surrogate representa-
tion.  The Democrat living in a Republican state, on this account, can 
look not only to Democratic members of Congress, but also to states 
that are governed by Democrats.  As this framing suggests, surrogate 
representation is likely to be more of a wholesale than retail phenome-
non at the state level — partisans will look to the governments of oth-
er states rather than to particular legislators, as Mansbridge posits 
with respect to Congress.  But this composite type of representation 
may be quite meaningful, particularly for individuals whose party is in 
the minority at the national level.   
One might object that the premise of representation is defeated by 
this extension.  Congress is a national lawmaking body that relies on 
aggregated representation, so even if the Democratic Tennessean re-
gards a senator from California as her surrogate representative, that 
representative is part of the same body as the senators from Tennessee.  
The Tennessean is simply shifting her focus of allegiance and interest 
within a single decisionmaking body.  When she turns to the state of 
California, however, she is not finding representation; she might as 
well be trumpeting French social policies or advocating for the British 
National Health Service.  
But this objection sells short the way states are key players in na-
tional politics.  The Tennessean’s connection to California may be 
much deeper than supposed because states regularly act not as sepa-
rate polities but as platforms for national political struggle.  States 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 250 Id.; see also Weissberg, supra note 248, at 536 (arguing that Americans will often be best 
represented in Congress by someone with whom they have no direct electoral relationship, and 
that one’s best representative may change across time and issue areas).  Mansbridge offers the 
following example: “A member of Congress from Minnesota . . . may lead the Congressional oppo-
sition to a war opposed by significant numbers of voters in Missouri and Ohio whose own repre-
sentatives support the war.”  Mansbridge, supra note 9, at 522. 
 251 Mansbridge, supra note 9, at 524–25; cf. SWAIN, supra note 248, at 219 (noting that “often 
people who are Democratic party members are reluctant to request casework from a Republican 
representative” and thus contact a Democratic representative from outside of their district for as-
sistance); Adam B. Cox, Partisan Gerrymandering and Disaggregated Redistricting, 2004 SUP. CT. 
REV. 409, 411–12 (suggesting that partisan gerrymandering’s harms occur at the level of Congress 
as a whole and not at the level of individual state redistricting). 
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with Democratic governments take affirmative actions to further a na-
tional partisan agenda during a time of Republican federal govern-
ance.  They push back against federal programs, enact competing poli-
cies, and establish new approaches that realign federal policy over 
time.252  When states oppose national policy, they often provide a more 
visible, affirmative version of the congressional minority’s statements 
on the House or Senate floor.  As a way of participating in national 
politics, then, the Tennessean may choose to participate in another 
state’s politics by donating money or otherwise becoming active in a 
political campaign, as I will discuss in Part IV.  Even if she does not 
actively engage in these ways, she may enjoy the psychic comfort of 
knowing that her team is in control somewhere.253  The fact of fifty 
states means, moreover, that she may look to a variety of states.  Be-
cause states governed by a single party advance national partisan 
stances in different ways and attend to different issues, multiple states 
may furnish surrogate representation.  While she looks to California on 
environmental questions, the Tennessean may simultaneously look to 
Massachusetts on same-sex marriage and New York on gun control.254  
She can identify with these other states not as separate polities but as 
national political actors that speak for her. 
As this suggests, it is not only the American whose party is out of 
power who may seek out other states for surrogate representation.   
Individuals whose states are controlled by their political party may  
also affiliate with other states, and they may do so even when their po-
litical party is in power in Washington as well.  Federalism’s fifty 
states enable intraparty, not only interparty, differences to yield policy 
variegation, and they create a platform for the national without Wash-
ington.255  Democrats across the country may take California’s envi-
ronmental leadership to represent their views, while Republicans 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 252 See generally supra Part I, pp. 1082–108. 
 253 Cf. GREEN ET AL., supra note 6, at 206, 219–20 (analogizing parties to teams and stating 
that partisans continue to root for their teams during the periods between elections). 
 254 As my repeated invocation of particular states suggests, not all fifty states are identical for 
purposes of partisan affiliation.  Some states are truer blue or deeper red than others.  And some 
have greater resources, larger populations, or bolder politicians.  But the foregrounding of a few 
states is not inconsistent with federalism.  Cf. Levy, supra note 135, at 469 (“[I]t perhaps need not 
be the case that all provinces in a successful federation can successfully command loyalty against 
the center. . . . [A] few such provinces, or even one, might serve as an anchor of the whole system.” 
(emphasis omitted)).  The focus on particular states also underscores the degree of compatibility 
between my account and those that treat states as distinct cultural enclaves or civil societies.  
While many states are not distinctive in this way, states with certain types of cultural, ethnic, or 
religious distinctiveness may be particularly powerful carriers of partisanship.  That said, cultural 
or other forms of identification may impede individuals’ partisan-based identification with other 
states, making the fact of fifty states (rather than one red and one blue alternative) all the more 
important. 
 255 See supra section III.A, pp. 1123–30. 
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across the country may take Virginia’s ban on same-sex marriage and 
civil unions to represent theirs.  And individuals throughout the coun-
try may actively seek to mold the politics of other states, focusing on 
states that have a stronger partisan lock on government or that priori-
tize issues differently.  Democratic residents of blue states unlikely to 
pass gun control measures may push for such legislation in New York.  
Republican residents of red states that recognize union shops may 
push for “right to work” policies in Wisconsin.  When they seek to fur-
ther partisan agendas across state lines, these individuals adopt other 
states as microcosms of their national community.  As federalism maps 
out national partisan divisions, it encourages individuals to affiliate 
beyond state borders. 
IV.  STATE ELECTIONS AND POLITICAL COMMUNITY 
If the partisan dimension of contemporary federalism prompts in-
dividuals to affiliate with states in which they do not reside, what form 
might that affiliation take?  This Part surveys a few doctrines and 
practices concerning cross-border engagement and considers how they 
may be rationalized or called into question by the partisan aspect of 
today’s federalism.  Section IV.A considers Americans’ engagement in 
electoral contests outside their states of residence, focusing on cam-
paign finance.  Section IV.B considers state freedom of information 
acts that limit nonresident access to public records.  With respect to 
both questions, I suggest that porous, rather than impervious, borders 
may facilitate states’ ability to serve as counterweights to the federal 
government and as sites of political identification. 
A.  Bluman v. FEC: Political Engagement Across State Lines 
In recent years, political engagement across state lines has in-
creased dramatically.  This engagement is not limited to out-of-state 
spending for federal representatives,256 but also extends to state elec-
toral contests and referenda.257  In the 2012 Wisconsin gubernatorial 
recall election, for instance, out-of-state contributions made up a ma-
jority of Governor Scott Walker’s arsenal and nearly a third of chal-
lenger Tom Barrett’s funds.258  For South Dakota’s 2006 referendum 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 256 There is plenty of that, too.  See, e.g., 2014 Overview: Top In-State vs. Out-of-State, CTR. 
FOR RESPONSIVE POL., http://www.opensecrets.org/overview/instvsout.php (last visited Nov. 
24, 2013) (showing that many congressional candidates receive more funds from out-of-state 
sources than in-state sources). 
 257 This conclusion is based on data for the fifty states spanning the last two decades that I 
compiled from the National Institute on Money in State Politics.  This data set is on file with the 
Harvard Law School Library. 
 258 2012 Gubernatorial Recall: Compare Campaign Contributions to Committees, MILWAUKEE-
WISCONSIN J. SENTINEL, http://www.jsonline.com/watchdog/dataondemand/140931763.html 
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on abortion, a substantial majority of the funds for both sides came 
from other states.259  As one commentator puts it: “Means of commu-
nication, fundraising and also campaigning are becoming national — 
and it’s affecting state and even local races.”260 
Cross-state engagement furnishes powerful evidence of partisan 
federalism.  For one thing, party organizations are among the most ac-
tive cross-state participants; the Democratic and Republican Gover-
nors Associations have poured hundreds of millions of dollars into 
state races in the past decade.261  Party actors recognize the power of 
the states as platforms for national conflict.  But so too do individuals, 
who get involved directly in out-of-state politics for many reasons.  In 
some cases, a donor might contemplate moving to a different state to 
take advantage of a new policy or visiting to benefit from the policy 
during a briefer stay.  In other cases, one state’s decisions may effec-
tively set policy for the entire nation.  But in perhaps the largest num-
ber of cases, Americans do not stand to benefit immediately or directly 
from out-of-state political involvement.  Instead, they seek to create 
momentum for a particular policy or political party, to build a real-life 
example to inform national debate, or simply to take comfort in know-
ing that their preferences are actual policy — and their partisan group 
is in control — somewhere.262  By channeling money toward states 
other than their own and embracing the kind of surrogate representa-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
(last updated July 7, 2012).  The ensuing spate of 2012 gubernatorial races also involved consider-
able out-of-state spending.  See, e.g., Paul Abowd & John Dunbar, North Carolina Governor’s 
Race Awash in Out-of-State Funds, CTR. FOR PUB. INTEGRITY (Sept. 5, 2012, 10:53 AM),  
h t t p : / / w w w . p u b l i c i n t e g r i t y . o r g / 2 0 1 2 / 0 9 / 0 5 / 1 0 7 9 3 / n o r t h - c a r o l i n a - g o v e r n o r s - r a c e - a w a s h - o u t - s t a t e 
-funds; Andrew Garber, Tab for Governor’s Race: $46 Million, SEATTLE TIMES (Nov. 3, 2012, 
6:01 PM), http://seattletimes.com/html/localnews/2019600162_money04m.html. 
 259 Patrick M. Garry et al., Raising the Question of Whether Out-of-State Political Contribu-
tions May Affect a Small State’s Political Autonomy: A Case Study of the South Dakota Voter 
Referendum on Abortion, 55 S.D. L. REV. 35, 42 n.44 (2010) (showing that ninety percent of the 
funds for opponents of the abortion ban and sixty-five percent for proponents came from out of 
state).  In every state they have been on the ballot, same-sex marriage questions have likewise at-
tracted significant out-of-state money.  For California’s Proposition 8, for instance, both propo-
nents and opponents raised more than a quarter of their total money from out of state.  Maloy 
Moore, Proposition 8: Tracking the Money: Final Numbers, L.A. TIMES, http://www.latimes.com 
/news/local/la-moneymap,0,2198220.htmlstory (last updated Feb. 3, 2009, 6:21 PM). 
 260 Big Donors Give Far and Wide, Influencing Out-of-State Races and Issues, NBC NEWS 
INVESTIGATIONS (Oct. 8, 2012, 7:31 AM), http://openchannel.nbcnews.com/_news/2012/10/08 
/14291297-big-donors-give-far-and-wide-influencing-out-of-state-races-and-issues (quoting Mi-
chael J. Malbin, Director of the Campaign Finance Institute) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 261 Torres-Spelliscy, supra note 41, at 502–05.  
 262 See, e.g., Big Donors Give Far and Wide, Influencing Out-of-State Races and Issues, supra 
note 260 (“Some Republicans, in say, California, will donate to help the Republican Party [in Io-
wa] because they feel it will go further than if they donate where they live in a more Democratic 
state . . . .” (alteration in original) (quoting Megan Stiles, spokesperson for the Iowa Republican 
Party) (internal quotation marks omitted)).  
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tion I have explored in Part III, these individuals are enacting partisan 
federalism. 
If we see cross-state political participation, however, it is not be-
cause existing federalism doctrine or theory supports the practice.  In-
stead, it is because such activity has been protected as expression un-
der the First Amendment.  Today, only Alaska and Hawaii impose any 
limits on out-of-state contributions, and no state limits out-of-state ex-
penditures.263  Although the Alaska Supreme Court upheld the state’s 
residency-based limits, citing “deep suspicions of the motives and wis-
dom of those who, from outside its borders, wish to remold Alaska,”264 
federal courts have rejected, on First Amendment grounds, attempts 
by other states to impose similar restrictions.265  Courts have also 
largely invalidated — as inconsistent with the First Amendment — 
state requirements that petition circulators be state residents.266 
While these courts have focused on the expressive dimensions of 
cross-border contributions and expenditures and have not considered 
their validity from a federalism perspective,267 a recent case raises the 
question of whether such expressive activity undermines American 
federalism and may accordingly be proscribed.  In Bluman v. FEC,268 
a three-judge panel of the D.C. District Court took up a loose end left 
by the Supreme Court’s holding in Citizens United v. FEC269: “wheth-
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 263 ALASKA STAT. § 15.13.072 (2012) (prohibiting candidates from receiving contributions from 
out-of-state individuals exceeding specified amounts, and prohibiting political parties from raising 
more than ten percent of contributions from out-of-state individuals); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 11-362 (LexisNexis 2012) (providing that contributions from out-of-state individuals other than 
candidates’ family members shall not exceed thirty percent of a candidate’s contributions).  A 
number of states limit public matching funds to in-district residents or voters.  See, e.g., ARIZ. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-946 (2006); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 9-704 (West 2009); FLA. STAT. 
§ 106.33 (2013); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 169.212 (West 2005). 
 264 State v. Alaska Civil Liberties Union, 978 P.2d 597, 617 (Alaska 1999).  
 265 See, e.g., Landell v. Sorrell, 382 F.3d 91, 146 (2d Cir. 2004) (striking down portion of Ver-
mont law that would have limited out-of-state contributions to twenty-five percent of a candi-
date’s contributions), rev’d and remanded on other grounds sub nom. Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 
230 (2006); VanNatta v. Keisling, 151 F.3d 1215, 1218 (9th Cir. 1998) (striking down Oregon con-
stitutional amendment prohibiting state candidates from using out-of-district contributions). 
 266 The Supreme Court has not directly addressed the issue.  In Buckley v. American Constitu-
tional Law Foundation, 525 U.S. 182 (1998), the Court struck down — as inconsistent with the 
First Amendment — a state requirement that petition circulators be registered voters, though it 
suggested a residency requirement would be more narrowly tailored.  See id. at 197.  Several cir-
cuit courts have invalidated residency requirements for petition circulators on First Amendment 
grounds.  See Libertarian Party of Va. v. Judd, 718 F.3d 308, 319 (4th Cir. 2013); Yes on Term 
Limits, Inc. v. Savage, 550 F.3d 1023, 1025 (10th Cir. 2008); Nader v. Blackwell, 545 F.3d 459, 475 
(6th Cir. 2008); Nader v. Brewer, 531 F.3d 1028, 1038 (9th Cir. 2008); Krislov v. Rednour, 226 F.3d 
851, 866 (7th Cir. 2000).  But see Initiative & Referendum Inst. v. Jaeger, 241 F.3d 614, 616–17 
(8th Cir. 2001) (upholding North Dakota requirement that petition circulators be state residents). 
 267 The federalism angle has sometimes been pressed by litigants or the dissent. See, e.g., 
VanNatta, 151 F.3d at 1222–25 (Brunetti, J., dissenting). 
 268 800 F. Supp. 2d 281 (D.D.C. 2011), aff’d, 132 S. Ct. 1087 (2012) (mem.).  
 269 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010). 
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er the Government has a compelling interest in preventing foreign in-
dividuals or associations from influencing our Nation’s political pro-
cess.”270  In a decision summarily affirmed by the Supreme Court,271 
the court upheld a provision of federal law that prohibits foreign na-
tionals from making contributions or expenditures in connection with 
federal, state, or local elections.272  The court reasoned that the case 
did not turn on the First Amendment questions that have dominated 
campaign finance jurisprudence but rather a “foundational question 
about the definition of the American political community.”273  “It is 
fundamental to the definition of our national political community,” the 
court maintained, “that foreign citizens do not have a constitutional 
right to participate in, and thus may be excluded from, activities of 
democratic self-government.”274  Recognizing political contributions 
and expenditures as integral to electoral processes, the court proceeded 
to define them as both speech and participation in democratic self-
government.275  Accordingly, it reasoned, limitations on foreign contri-
butions and expenditures are “all ‘part of the sovereign’s obligation to 
preserve the basic conception of a political community.’”276 
By moving from the speech-based logic of Citizens United and its 
precursors to a speaker-based logic, Bluman has recast the question of 
whether states may ban contributions and expenditures by nonresi-
dents.  After Bluman, it is no longer sufficient to define such activity 
as speech; it is also necessary to define who is speaking and how the 
speaker relates to the political community.  Is it true, as an amicus 
brief in an earlier case argued, that “from Oregon’s constitutional per-
spective, a citizen of Florida, Texas, or Vermont has no more of an in-
terest or stake in . . . making campaign contributions in Oregon than 
does a citizen of Montreal or Mexico City”?277  Or is it fundamentally 
misguided to treat Americans from different states as foreigners to one 
another? 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 270 Id. at 911; see also id. at 948 n.51 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 271 132 S. Ct. 1087. 
 272 2 U.S.C. § 441e(a) (2012). 
 273 Bluman, 800 F. Supp. 2d at 286.  
 274 Id. at 288.  Looking to cases holding that foreign citizens may be denied certain rights and 
privileges of United States citizens, such as voting, serving as jurors, or working as public school 
teachers, the court discerned this test: “The government may exclude foreign citizens from activi-
ties ‘intimately related to the process of democratic self-government.’”  Id. at 287 (quoting Bernal 
v. Fainter, 467 U.S. 216, 220 (1984)). 
 275 Id. at 288; see also id. at 289 (“When an expressive act is directly targeted at influencing the 
outcome of an election, it is both speech and participation in democratic self-government.”). 
 276 Id. at 288 (quoting Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291, 296 (1978) (internal quotation marks 
omitted)). 
 277 Brief of the National Voting Rights Institute as Amicus Curiae Supporting the Defendants-
Appellants at 18, VanNatta v. Keisling, 151 F.3d 1215 (9th Cir. 1998) (Nos. 95-35998, 95-35999). 
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Bluman itself sends mixed signals on this question.  In purely doc-
trinal terms, Bluman makes a strong case for limiting out-of-state fi-
nancial participation.  The opinion cites Gregory v. Ashcroft in support 
of the proposition that the government may exclude foreigners “from 
activities ‘intimately related to the process of democratic self-
government.’”278  Relying in part on the resident alien precedents sub-
sequently cited in Bluman, Gregory maintained that state citizens must 
be able to determine the qualifications of their government officials 
free from federal interference in order “to preserve the basic concep-
tion of a political community.”279  Moreover, to the extent that Bluman 
treats spending money as a form of participation in the process of 
democratic self-government, Article IV Privileges and Immunities doc-
trine suggests that states might permissibly restrict nonresidents from 
making contributions and expenditures.280  Although Privileges and 
Immunities jurisprudence is a nationalist strand of federalism juris-
prudence,281 the Court has long reserved to state residents the right to 
vote and to hold elective office,282 justifying these restrictions as pre-
serving the states as separate “political” communities283 and fostering 
individuals’ “identification with a particular State.”284  If contributions 
and expenditures are also forms of democratic participation that shore 
up political community, this doctrine suggests they too might be activi-
ties reserved to state residents. 
But if the doctrinal logic of Bluman casts cross-state political par-
ticipation as a form of foreign participation that may be proscribed, 
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 278 Bluman, 800 F. Supp. 2d at 287 (quoting Bernal, 467 U.S. at 220) (citing Gregory v.  
Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 462 (1991)). 
 279 Gregory, 501 U.S. at 462 (quoting Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 647 (1973)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 280 This point has not been lost on litigants seeking to defend the regulation of out-of-state con-
tributions and expenditures.  See, e.g., Brief in Opposition at 22–24, Am. Tradition P’ship v.  
Bullock, 132 S. Ct. 2490 (2012) (No. 11-1179).  
 281 See, e.g., Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. 168, 180 (1868) (“It has been justly said that no provision 
in the Constitution has tended so strongly to constitute the citizens of the United States one people 
as [the Privileges and Immunities Clause].”).   
 282 See, e.g., Supreme Court v. Piper, 470 U.S. 274, 282 n.13 (1985); Baldwin v. Fish & Game 
Comm’n, 436 U.S. 371, 383 (1978); Sugarman, 413 U.S. at 647; Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 
343–44 (1972); see also Holt Civic Club v. Tuscaloosa, 439 U.S. 60, 68–69 (1978). 
 283 E.g., Piper, 470 U.S. at 282 n.13; Sugarman, 413 U.S. at 647.  
 284 Baldwin, 436 U.S. at 383.  The emphasis on state political communities as sites of individu-
al identification finds an echo in U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779 (1995).  See id. 
at 823 n.32 (“[T]he voters of Arkansas, in adopting [a term-limits amendment], were acting as citi-
zens of the State of Arkansas, and not as citizens of the National Government.”); id. at 838  
(Kennedy, J., concurring) (discussing citizens’ discrete state and federal “political capacities”); id. 
at 849 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (discussing state citizens’ “separate political identities”).  Thornton 
might offer doctrinal support for Americans’ participation across state lines with respect to feder-
al elections, but not with respect to state elections.  Cf. Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 117–18 
(1970) (Black, J., announcing the judgments of the Court) (holding that Congress could fix voting 
age for national, but not state, elections). 
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the opinion seems eager to head off just such claims.  Responding to 
the plaintiffs’ argument that contributions and expenditures are not 
democratic participation akin to voting, as evidenced by the fact that 
Americans do not vote but do make contributions and expenditures re-
lated to elections in states other than their own, the court insisted that 
citizens of other states are “members of the American political com-
munity.”285  Given particular concerns about “foreign influence,” the 
court further reasoned, “a law that is justified as applied to aliens may 
not be justified as applied to citizens of the United States.”286  In so 
framing the issue, the court appeared to reject the sort of federalism 
argument made in litigation about out-of-state contributions and ex-
penditures — namely, that if states are discrete political communities, 
then out-of-state donors are exerting “foreign influence.”  Even as its 
reasoning points the way to restricting cross-state political participa-
tion in order to protect state political communities, Bluman suggests 
that the relevant political community is the United States, not the fifty 
states as such. 
Bluman and existing doctrine ultimately point to two different ap-
proaches to cross-state political participation on federalism grounds: 
either, on a strong federalist logic, states are meaningful political com-
munities and cross-border activity may be proscribed to preserve them 
as such, or, on a strong nationalist logic, cross-border activity must be 
permitted because the United States is one national community. 
We might instead eschew such dichotomous thinking and under-
stand cross-border participation to be consistent with federalism inso-
far as political participation across state lines reflects and reaffirms the 
states’ significance as governments and sites of political community.  
Most narrowly, such participation allows individuals who feel alienat-
ed from their own state government to affiliate with another state gov-
ernment.  More broadly, it underscores that states serve as opponents 
of and counterbalances to the federal government for the nation at 
large.  In keeping with Bluman’s dicta, this understanding casts all 
Americans as members of a national political community.  Moving  
beyond Bluman, it recognizes the states as discrete political communi-
ties — but ones that are, in critical respects, discrete national political 
communities. 
One might raise a variety of objections to this defense of cross-
border participation.  A critique internal to the argument I have of-
fered might run as follows: for states to serve as political counter-
weights to the federal government and sites of individual partisan 
identification, they must be meaningfully different from the federal 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 285 Bluman v. FEC, 800 F. Supp. 2d 281, 290 (D.D.C. 2011), aff’d, 132 S. Ct. 1087 (2012) (mem.).  
 286 Id.  
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government, but if state elections are shaped by individuals across the 
nation, we will not see significant divergence.  To bolster partisan fed-
eralism, we should instead restrict political participation to state resi-
dents in order to distinguish the states from the federal government 
and from one another.287 
This objection has force.  But, I submit, partisan federalism is more 
consistent with cross-border participation than with its prohibition.  
Given the restriction of the franchise to state residents and a popula-
tion unevenly distributed across fifty states, cross-state engagement 
will not eliminate partisan diversity across states and the federal gov-
ernment.288  Already today Americans participate in political contests 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 287 One can also imagine a pragmatic objection, emphasizing that restricting out-of-state con-
tributions and expenditures could more generally tame campaign finance — and in particular, the 
huge sums flowing from corporations, Super PACs, and extremely wealthy individuals.  It is this 
sort of logic that seemed to animate the federalism-based arguments for Montana’s Corrupt Prac-
tices Act, which was invalidated by the Supreme Court in American Tradition Partnership v. 
Bullock, 132 S. Ct. 2490 (2012).  See, e.g., Brief in Opposition, supra note 280; Brief for New York 
et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents, Bullock, 132 S. Ct. 2490 (2012) (No. 11-1179).  
But there are costs to framing the problem in terms of engagement by “foreign” out-of-state resi-
dents.  The argument advanced in this Article does, however, align with the commitment of such 
critics in other respects.  Underscoring the importance of individuals’ identification with the poli-
ty, this argument embraces Bluman’s recognition of campaign spending as democratic participa-
tion — a recognition that supports equality, participation, and integrity values that the Supreme 
Court has dismissed or defined in a crabbed way.  See, e.g., Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 
876 (2010) (articulating a narrow view of corruption as quid-pro-quo corruption); Buckley v. 
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48–49 (1976) (per curiam) (holding that “equalizing the relative ability of indi-
viduals and groups to influence the outcome of elections,” id. at 48, is not a constitutionally per-
missible purpose). 
 288 One might argue that the logic advanced here further requires allowing individuals 
throughout the nation to vote in state elections.  Similar proposals have been made in the local 
government literature.  See Richard Thompson Ford, The Boundaries of Race: Political Geogra-
phy in Legal Analysis, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1841, 1909–10 (1994) (proposing opening local elections 
to all members of a metropolitan region or state); Frug, supra note 143, at 329–30 (proposing a 
plan “in which everyone gets five votes that they can cast in whatever local elections they feel af-
fect their interest,” id. at 329, including elections outside their immediate region); see also Richard 
Briffault, The Local Government Boundary Problem in Metropolitan Areas, 48 STAN. L. REV. 
1115, 1156–62 (1996) (critiquing such proposals); Richard Thompson Ford, Beyond Borders: A 
Partial Response to Richard Briffault, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1173 (1996) (responding to the critique).  
While cross-state voting merits additional consideration, the argument here does not push that far.  
This Article has suggested that individuals throughout the nation have a stake in other states’ 
politics and should have a means of influencing these politics and channeling their energies to-
ward the states.  But measures short of voting suffice for these purposes.  Indeed, even as Bluman 
blurs the line between voting and campaign contributions by casting both as forms of political 
participation, it does not indicate that the two must be treated identically.  
  Jerry Frug’s proposal might also suggest that cross-border contributions and expenditures 
should be permitted only within limits — for example, individuals might give in connection with 
only a certain number of races.  This would allow the alienated individual of section III.B to reaf-
firm her political identity and community while impeding any particular individual’s or organiza-
tion’s effort to shape every state election.  See supra note 287 (noting equality, integrity, and par-
ticipation concerns).  While this sort of proposal seems fanciful given the state of First 
Amendment jurisprudence, it is intriguing from a federalism perspective. 
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beyond their states of residence, and the states do not mirror either the 
federal government or one another.  On the other side of the balance, 
allowing people across the nation to contribute money and time to po-
litical contests in states other than their own enables them to affiliate 
with these states.289  The law shapes as well as reflects our political 
identities; because cross-border political participation is permitted un-
der existing law, it is relatively easy for individuals to identify with 
other states as they seek to influence those states’ politics.290  If the 
law proscribed such engagement, Americans’ identification with other 
states would likely decline accordingly.  More broadly, recognizing the 
legitimacy of cross-border participation underscores the role of the 
states as significant political actors in our national polity.  The very 
fact that individuals from Texas seek to influence California politics, 
and vice versa, indicates that the states are critical actors on the na-
tional stage.  Cross-state political participation demonstrates states’ 
importance as sites of governance and identification, not their lack 
thereof. 
B.  McBurney v. Young: State Freedom of Information Acts 
The question of political participation across state lines concerns 
whether Americans may seek to shape the government composition 
and policies of states they do not inhabit.  The flip side of this question 
concerns what obligations states owe to residents of other states, the 
classic province of Article IV Privileges and Immunities doctrine.  Just 
last Term, the Supreme Court rejected one possible obligation: to share 
information about state governance with nonresidents and residents on 
equal terms.  In McBurney v. Young,291 residents of Rhode Island and 
California challenged the citizens-only provision of Virginia’s Freedom 
of Information Act (VFOIA), which limits access to public records to 
Virginia citizens and media with circulation in the state.292  In a terse 
opinion, the Court rejected both the Privileges and Immunities and 
dormant Commerce Clause challenges to the law, including the argu-
ment that a right of access to public information should be considered 
fundamental for purposes of the Privileges and Immunities Clause.293  
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 289 Cf. WALZER, supra note 34, at 100 (“[P]eople who have given money and people who have 
helped to get it are more loyal to the cause, or loyal longer, than those who merely have reason to 
think that the cause is just.”).  
 290 Cf. Jonathan D. Varat, State “Citizenship” and Interstate Equality, 48 U. CHI. L. REV.  
487, 518 (1981) (“Decreasing the significance of state residence tends to strengthen interstate  
attachments . . . .”). 
 291 133 S. Ct. 1709 (2013). 
 292 Id. at 1713. 
 293 Id. at 1716–19.  The Third Circuit had previously concluded that access to public records is 
necessary to be able to “engage in the political process with regard to matters of national political 
and economic importance.”  Lee v. Minner, 458 F.3d 194, 198 (3d Cir. 2006) (quoting Lee v. 
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Here I want to focus on one slice of the case — the Court’s supposition 
that Virginia has a federalism-based interest in preventing, in the col-
orful formulation of Justice Scalia, “outlanders [from] mucking around 
in . . . Virginia government.”294 
Throughout the litigation, Virginia defended the citizens-only pro-
vision as a safeguard of political community.295  Shying away from an 
economic defense of the law, the state insisted that the “purpose of the 
law is political” and, as such, “its benefits are logically and properly 
bestowed on those directly affected by [the state’s] political process — 
i.e., citizens” and withheld from “noncitizens with no direct stake in 
Virginia politics and governance.”296  As foreshadowed by questions 
from the bench at oral argument,297 a unanimous Court accepted this 
justification for the citizens-only provision, noting in its opinion that 
the law “represents a mechanism by which those who ultimately hold 
sovereign power (i.e., the citizens of the Commonwealth) may obtain 
an accounting from the public officials to whom they delegate the ex-
ercise of that power.”298 
Such claims about sovereign power and political community echo 
the federalism arguments about out-of-state contributions and expendi-
tures canvassed above.299  This is unsurprising: questions concerning 
the flow of money into state politics and the flow of information out of 
state government are two sides of the same coin.  Both turn on the re-
lationship of Americans to other states’ political sphere: for the former, 
nonresidents seek to participate in state politics, while for the latter 
they seek to learn about state politics.  The symmetry of the two ques-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
Minner, 369 F. Supp. 2d 527, 534 (D. Del. 2005)) (internal quotation marks omitted), abrogated by 
McBurney, 133 S. Ct. 1709. 
 294 Transcript of Oral Argument at 21, McBurney, 133 S. Ct. 1709 (No. 12-17), available at 
http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/12-17.pdf. 
 295 See, e.g., Brief of Respondents at 31, McBurney, 133 S. Ct. 1709 (No. 12-17). 
 296 Id. at 19.  Virginia’s amici similarly argued that “[t]he relevant audience for State govern-
ment consists of State citizens.”  Brief of the National Conference of State Legislatures et al. as 
Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 16, McBurney, 133 S. Ct. 1709 (No. 12-17); see also id. 
at 4 (“The central purpose of Virginia’s open-records law is to enable Virginia citizens to observe 
their government in operation and to hold their public officials accountable.  This Court has 
made clear that States may properly determine membership in their own political community.”). 
 297 See, e.g., Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 294, at 8 (Scalia, J.) (“It seems to me en-
tirely in accord with that purpose of these [sunshine] laws to say it’s only Virginia citizens 
who . . . are concerned about the functioning of Virginia government, and ought to be able to get 
whatever records Virginia agencies have.”); id. at 9 (Ginsburg, J.) (“Now, Virginia doesn’t allow 
people from out of State to vote.  They’re not part of Virginia’s political community.  So . . . if 
you’re not part of the political community, then you don’t fall under FOIA . . . .”); id. at 47–48 
(Breyer, J.) (“[Y]ou say, well, but look, there must be something left that the States can reserve to 
their own citizens. . . . This is just an interest in trying to find out how State institutions work, 
and the voters have the main interest there . . . .”). 
 298 McBurney, 133 S. Ct. at 1716. 
 299 See supra section IV.A, pp. 1135–42. 
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tions suggests that we might think similarly about them in federalism 
terms.  If states may, after McBurney, exclude nonresidents from ob-
taining information about state government’s workings, the case is 
bolstered for states to restrict “outlanders” from making contributions 
and expenditures in connection with state elections.  Both arguments 
suggest that the United States is composed of discrete state political 
communities and that nonresidents may be denied access to state rec-
ords and political campaigns in order to recognize and preserve these 
political communities.  If anything, reserving information about state 
government to residents seems more attenuated from maintaining a 
state political community than does prohibiting out-of-state contribu-
tions and expenditures.300 
As I have argued with respect to cross-border contributions and 
expenditures, however, porous state borders are not inconsistent with 
federalism.  Nonresidents may have a “stake in Virginia politics and 
governance”301 precisely insofar as they are Virginia’s politics and gov-
ernance.  Virginia, for example, helped lead the Republican charge 
against the Affordable Care Act, and individuals throughout the coun-
try looked to the state for surrogate representation in this fight.302  
While most VFOIA-disclosed information likely would not bear on 
partisan conflicts, and certainly not on partisan conflicts of this magni-
tude, some of it would — and it is very hard if not impossible to draw 
these lines ex ante.303  The fact that Mark McBurney, a Rhode Island 
resident, was able to receive information pertaining specifically to his 
child-support dispute with his ex-wife through other channels open to 
nonresidents thus does not lessen the concern that he was unable to re-
ceive “any general policy information” from the state.304 
To the extent that the federalist value of fostering political commu-
nity is said to justify the citizens-only provision, partisan federalism 
suggests this same value may cut in favor of more open state borders.  
A VFOIA open to all Americans would — as with cross-border contri-
butions and expenditures — recognize states as political communities, 
but discrete national political communities.  And allowing individuals 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 300 Cf. Lee v. Minner, 458 F.3d 194, 201 (3d Cir. 2006) (“[T]he State has offered no reason why 
permitting noncitizens to access public information would diminish its ability to define its political 
community.  There is no evidence that allowing noncitizens to directly obtain information will 
weaken the bond between the State of Delaware and its citizens.”), abrogated by McBurney, 133 
S. Ct. 1709. 
 301 Brief of Respondents, supra note 295, at 19. 
 302 See generally supra notes 74–79 and accompanying text.  
 303 The fact that the Democratic and Republican Parties may, through local offices and liaisons, 
make FOIA requests even in states with citizens-only provisions does not undercut this claim giv-
en that a variety of individuals and organizations not directly associated with the party apparatus 
as such may have partisan interests in information.  See generally section I.A.1, pp. 1083–89; Part 
II, pp. 1108–22. 
 304 McBurney, 133 S. Ct. at 1714. 
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throughout the country to “muck around” in Virginia government 
could thus reaffirm the significance of states, highlighting their role as 
a counterbalance and alternative to the federal government for all 
Americans.  In short, we should be skeptical of the claim recently ac-
cepted by the Court that “[t]he relevant audience for State government 
consists of State citizens.”305 
CONCLUSION 
Partisanship is critical to understanding contemporary American 
federalism.  The states challenge the federal government, as doctrine 
and scholarship assume they will, because some number of them are 
governed by members of the political party out of power at the nation-
al level.  Individuals identify with the states and not only the federal 
government, as federalism theory suggests they must, because the 
states represent different political parties and different partisan possi-
bilities.  Partisan federalism also sheds new light on doctrines and 
practices, such as cross-state contributions and expenditures, that we 
tend not to think of in federalism terms. 
The account offered here is in critical respects a particular story 
about federalism at the turn of the twenty-first century.  Partisan fed-
eralism has emerged with the decline of dual federalism and the rise of 
ideologically cohesive, polarized parties, and, because these phenome-
na are historically contingent, the story will no doubt change in the fu-
ture.  Yet aspects of the account have both deep roots and staying 
power.  Since Virginia and Kentucky’s opposition to the Alien and Se-
dition Acts, states have presented a vision of the national will different 
from that offered by the federal government.  As our partisan land-
scape continues to change, states will serve as discrete sites of national 
governance and participate in nationwide controversies on behalf of 
people both inside and outside their borders. 
Partisan federalism not only helps to explain enduring features of 
the relationship among the states, the federal government, and the 
people, but also opens up new lines of inquiry.  While I have suggested 
that partisanship and federalism are mutually constitutive in the  
United States today, my focus has been on how partisanship shapes 
our federalism.  Much more could be written about how federalism 
shapes our partisanship, a question with both theoretical and doctrinal 
import.306  Such an exploration might, for instance, lead to a new justi-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 305 Brief of the National Conference of State Legislatures et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of 
Respondents, supra note 296, at 16; see also McBurney, 133 S. Ct. at 1716 (noting that the purpose 
of VFOIA was to provide the “citizens of the Commonwealth” with a check on the “public offi-
cials to whom they delegate the exercise of [sovereign] power”). 
 306 For some initial thoughts, see section III.A, pp. 1123–30. 
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fication for, or critique of, the law regarding state regulation of politi-
cal parties.  Partisan federalism might also enrich our thinking about 
local government law.  We could consider, for example, how some cit-
ies, such as Atlanta, Austin, and Nashville, engage in partisan fights 
with their states, while others, such as New York and San Francisco, 
function as partisan actors on the national stage.  As these and other 
questions underscore, partisan federalism inspires a fresh look at fed-
eralism and partisanship alike. 
